I note the following from Alex Mikaberidze's The Battle of Borodino:

"Marshal Ney was told to deploy his three divisions (about 10,000 men) behind the redoubt, arranging them in brigade columns with the artillery on the left wing. Behind them were two divisions (around 7,500 men) from VIII corps." p. 100. His source for this order is 'Ney to Berthier, 9 September 1812, in Markham, Imperial Glory, p. 292.

"The III Corps...was then ordered to advance." The 10th Division marched first, arranged 'in attack columns, with its last regiments in battalion columns deployed at the distance of a division, ready to form square and to serve as reserve'. It was followed by the 25th and 11th Divisions and the 8th (Westphalian) Corps, which was moving in two columns." p. 104. His sources here include Segur, Bertin, Joly, Thiers, Vigier, Lejeune, Rossetti, Buturlin, Chambray, Sainte-Hillaire and Davout's Correspondance.

"Ney's troops reached the Russian positions between 7.30-8am. Ney let the 11th Division (Razout) carry the northern fleche while the turned the 10th and 25th Divisions south to support Davout's already fatigued soldiers in securing the southern fleche." p. 107.

This appears to agree that the divisions were lined up, in brigade columns. However when they advanced the composition of at least the 10th was mixed, with attack columns leading the way supported by the more compact battalion columns. Yet when the attack went in the first two divisions were diverted south (as Pelleport also alludes to), leaving the trailing 11th to attack the principle target of the northern fleche, which seems like an odd thing to do.

From memory I think Ney had earlier used a very deep formation of battalion columns one behind the other at Friedland in his first attack. It was repulsed and proved to be unsuccessful.

Regards,
Chris