Thanks for that again, Lutz Langer used this massive work along wit Klaeber for our defense of Bernadotte

here Barton :

But the Emperor hopes that he
will be in the position which he has indicated to him at
Dornburg. {Si le MarMial Bernadotte se trouvait avec
vous, vous pourriez marcher ensemble. Mais I'Empereur
esphe qu'il sera dans la position qu'il lui a indiqu6 a
Dornburg.) " ^
This message was in the highest degree equivocal.
Bernadotte was not ordered to march with Davout, nor
was Davout ordered to take any particular route to
Appolda. Bernadotte was told that, if he happened to
be with Davout, he " might " march with him. At the
same time he was told that it was important that he
should have gone to Dornburg, and that the Emperor
expected him and wished him to be there. He was
near, but not " with," Davout. The two corps were
bivouacked on different roads—Bernadotte's corps being
posted on the road to Dornburg, and Davout's on the
road to Kosen. It was obvious that if he were to
march with Davout, and if the Prussians were to escape
or debouch by the bridges of Camburg and Dornburg,
he would incur tremendous blame. The message was
so framed that, whatever might be the event, the Staff
would be able to justify themselves under its terms.
Equivocal orders of this kind were by no means
uncommon in the Grand Army. Colonel Maude refers
to them in the following pointed terms : "It would
seem that it was now (October 1806) that there first
crept into the Staff the habit of dehberately framing
orders capable of being interpreted in several ways.

That and much much more can be found in this work.
Thans again