It appears that Wilson was wrong.

From Tactics of the Russian Army in the Napoleonic Wars, by Alexander Zhmodikov and Yurii Zhmodikov, Volume I:

'Tactical training of artillery was much too formalized for use in battle. The artillerymen tended to keep their pieces, limbers, and caissons aligned as if on a parade ground, without any attempts to use irregularities in the terrain as cover. Because there were no exercises and joint training between the three arms, the infantry and cavalry were not able to cooperate with artillery and the jagers did not protect artillery from enemy skirmishers. As a result of all this, at Austerlitz, the Russian artillery lost many men and horses from the fire of enemy skirmishers, and lost many pieces (133, or more than half of the total number ), because infantry and cavalry did not support artillery at critical moments. After the campaign, Colonel Kudryatsev, commadner of a heavy artillery company attached to the 4th column, was court-martialed for the loss of his cannon.'-64-65.

'In 1806-1807 the loss of a gun was still considered a great disgrace to an artillery officer. At Kolozomb...six light pieces were lost, and Captain Lbov went mad because of that. On the same day at Czarnowo, a heavy artillery company was removed from its position and sent to the rear before the fourth enemy attack, when it became clear that it was impossible to hold the position. Artillery officers made all possible efforts and often risked their lives to save their pieces, but nevertheless, during the retreat from Golymin, about 40 guns were abandoned because of the exhaustion of the horses and the deep mud.'-67.

Wilson may have been addressing Yermelov's attitude and position in 1807:

'In 1807 the attitude to a loss of artillery pieces started to change. Ermelov writes:

'During the battle of Heilsberg, many of our guns were taken by the enemy for some time, because I ordered the officers to care about their guns less than about firing the last shots at the closest range, and thus to pay for the guns if they are lost. They were told that there is less harm in losing guns than in the leaving of friendly troops without their support, and often without the very protection depending on them, by the taking of them away...too early. The officers were told about the cases that happened in the advance guard, when batteries, holding their position to the last, were not taken by the enemy, in spite of all their efforts. [They] were given examples where superior enemy forces were not able to force back the smallest units of our troops, only because the enemy was not able to frighten our artillery and to force it to withdraw; that if an officer, afraid of losing his guns, had abandoned his position, our troops would have been inevitably destroyed...''-70.

'Nevertheless, some artillery officers, especially higher commanders, still followed the old methods.' Old practices die hard and are difficult to change.

Finally, it should be noted that fighting your battery or gun company to the lasts, as the Russians were gradually beginning to do by 1807 is not the same thing as risking guns to gain an advantage. The Russians employed artillery defensively, not offensively as the French did and the differences in those ideas and practices is what was being addressed originally, not defending guns to the last extremity which was a characteristic of most, if not all, artillery arms of the period.

From Zhmodikovs, Volume II:

'The main purpose of artillery was to defend other troops.'-58.

Sincerely,
K