Dear Friends,

Sorry in advance if this post is a mix of different questions, but I think it is convenient to raise them all together and not separately. Any response will be appreciated by me. I clarify that my knowledge of the management of the English army is very limited so any error of appreciation is my own fault.

Reading lately about Albuera there are some questions that caught my attention and aroused my interest in trying to deepen them. The first is regarding the memoranda Wellington sent to Beresford on 23rd April 1811. Of the three, the one that interests me is the second one where Wellington proposes Albuera as a place to present a battle if he so decided. Was that a proposition or an order? “all this must be left to the discretion of sir William Beresford…” said Wellington, but it sounds me like an order. Is there any other example where Wellington specifies to his subordinates all the movements to follow, including the place to offer battle ?Was this a common practice in him? we do not find much difference here between the subordinates of Napoleon and Wellington with respect to their own initiatives.

As a point connected with the precedent, does the memorandum have any tactical specification of how to use the land? It is well known that Soult flanked the position by some bridges, and even one ford to the south that positioned him perpendicular to the allied line, which forced Beresford to modify his position. Was Beresford's own fault his choice of the position of the allied troops along the ridge, when his right flank was easily flanked by the fords? How should Wellington have supposed that Beresford would use the battlefield? Leaving aside the advantages of the position itself in terms of its associated roads , It would be interesting to know how wellington himself would have used it. Beresford neglect the existence of the south and north knolls that made their position, if flanked, in serious danger. I can not believe that Wellington, who chose the positions with care, did not specify how to use it. If you see an advantage in them, you must explain it. Obviously Beresford did not know how to use the position and was at the mercy of Soult's initiative, even, without using some of the advantages that were marked by his subordinates, in case that what Long said was true, that he marked him the convenience of occupying the heights of the right flank.

The third and final concern has to do with the resolution to mobilize Stewart's division on the right flank. Was that an order from Beresford? if it was an order we must suppose that Beresford had to specify how to deploy his division and in what position of the line, behind the Spaniards or on their flank. It is difficult to believe that Beresford sent his 2nd division without any precision about how and where deploy it. We know that was Stewart's decision to stand perpendicular to the French columns, which would make him responsible for the collapse of his brigades, but I can not believe that Beresford has not specified anything about it. But if it was not like that, we would find that his subordinates decided without his consultation, which is also striking. We would find two key movements, the deployment of Stewart and the counter-attack of the Fusiliers without an order in that sense.

It is striking that Beresford's subordinates were handled with a certain or much initiative of their own while their general only obeyed what the boss ordered him without even knowing how to do it.

best regards,

Manuel