Dear Anthony,

I am glad you are researching a project on the Second French Invasion of Portugal. Will it be a book? You are probably aware of my own 'Wellington Against Soult' book published in 2016. During research, I swiftly realised that being highly selective with the sources was necessary as I discovered far more than could be used in a work of 70,000 words. A longer, more detailed study is desirable and I hope you will be able to address this.

The main issue with the Second Invasion for a 'popular history book' is that there was no famous decisive battle and studies of retreats lack the same appeal for many readers. This is a shame since Wellesley achieved great things with his surprise attack over the Douro and consequent ejection of the French from northern Portugal in return for relatively little loss of life compared to other campaigns. I also found the effect of partisan warfare very interesting, particularly as irregulars caused Soult immense difficulties, despite his efforts to win Portuguese support. I suspect that you are right that French casualties due to guerrilla action are underestimated, especially with the frustration of Soult's attempt to cross the Minho (slowing his advance) and French inability to maintain a supply line with Ney's forces in northern Spain. This wasn't due to lack of trying as Soult garrisoned several towns along his invasion route, some of which were overwhelmed, and they proved incapable of keeping the roads open due to the strength of patriotic resistance. It is clear that Soult's decision to remain at Porto rather than mount a swift unsupported strike on Lisbon was correct. Even if Marshal Victor had attacked in the south and occupied Wellesley's forces, advancing on the capital before securing his communications would have been a dreadful risk.

Furthermore, the attempts of irregular forces to block Soult's line of retreat almost enabled Wellesley to trap an entire French army in the mountains, and the whole campaign provides many examples of effective co-operation between Wellesley's regular army and partisans. In Soult's defence, he is rarely afforded credit for evading the traps along his retreat and was lucky to escape with the bulk of his army at the cost of his artillery and baggage.

Some British historians allege that the French Army often delivered inaccurate or dishonest casualty returns and losses due to sickness and the climate rather than enemy action complicate this even further. However, I wouldn't be surprised if you discover evidence that the French lost many more men during the march on Porto and retreat from the same than has previously been believed. British forces pursuing Soult's army recorded arduous conditions and losses and they had the benefit of support. Just think how the French suffered having abandoned their supplies to march through the same conditions with scant hope of finding food and shelter.

Good luck with your research. I would love to hear the results.

Regards,

David