Scherer replaced General Dumerbion as commander of the Armee d'Italie in November 1795. Napoleon as a member of the central planning committee in Paris had convinced Dumerbion of his plan for operations in Italy. After Scherer took over, in conjunction with the Committee of Public Safety, Napoleon's plan was abandoned as Scherer 'showed no interest in the plans previously put forward by Bonaparte; indeed he thought them mistaken.' (see The Road to Rivoli by Martin Boycott-Brown, 99).

Scherer himself 'was a veteran of the Seven Years War who had also been an officer in the Austrian army, and he seems to have imbibed some of the grinding slowness and excessive caution that were typical of their methods' (Boycott-Brown, 99)...His own plans of January 1795 stated very clearly his belief than an attack on Piedmont would have to be launched over Colle di Tenda, because this was the only pass (apart from the Bocchetta) that was usable by an army taking its heavy artillery and supply wagons with it. He seems, in short, to have envisaged the sort of lumbering behemoth of an army with mountains of baggage that had been typical of the Seven Years War. His view that the siege of the great fortress of Cuneo was the key to success made him consider it essential to encumber his forces with heavy equipment from the outset, in contrast to Bonaparte's preference for lightness and speed' (Boycott-Brown, 99).

'Scherer, unlike Bonaparte, also felt that enormous reinforcements would be necessary before carrying out an offensive' (Boycott-Brown, 100).

So, it appears that it was not an issue of what year Napoleon took command, but that Napoleon was an aggressive and imaginative officer who believed in the offensive, and not waiting for reinforcements that would not come before undertaking operations and who believed in action and speed of action. Those command traits were not possessed by Scherer.