Hi Anthony!
I will try to answer some of your questions the best I can. I apologise to everyone reading this for my bad english. I hope all of you understand the dificulty to express complex ideas and concepts in a foreign language.
As far as I know there were no discussions, at that time, in Portugal, about Bernardim Freire conduct at the 1808 campaign. The Junta in Oporto approved is decision of not marching with the British army.
In 1809, Freire ordered the retreat from Braga after the French forced the Salamonde pass because is orders were to defend Oporto and he believed that defending Braga was useless and a waste. He paid with death.
(About Freire, the best source is the work of A. P. Vicente «Um soldado na Guerra Peninsular. Bernardim Freire de Andrade» 1970.)
From what I know Eben was forced to accept the command in Braga just after see the murder of Freire. I doubt that was a free willing decision and if he had, at any time, the confidence of the «armed people» that he «commanded» in the defence of the town. Basically the commanders were hostages; of course Eben knew as Freire before that «is» forces cannot stop the French. But the people want to resist at all costs and any order against was treason so Eben stayed and did what he can.
At this point in time, when we read that the X line regiment or the Y militia regiment was present in some combat we must understand that this units were very loosely organized, with few officers, poorly armed or even armed only with pikes; almost without uniforms; so they were not very different from the armed peasants, in military terms. So the «volatility»…
About the LLL I think is value is overrated; at Braga is «second division» was a little more than a group of volunteers without combat experience; of course with is new uniforms and British weapons they were conspicuous among the others.
About Wilson, in December of 1808 he «escaped» from Oporto only with is LLL division (only 500 men) going to Spain and based in Ciudad Rodrigo managed to disturb the French in Salamanca, with a «little war» of is own, helping to the isolation of Soult. He never commanded a significant Portuguese force until Beresford arrived.
Do you mean «non association» with the officers who collaborated with Junot? Of course the officers that left the army (like Lecor or Champalimaud) and didn’t go to France were considered patriots by the people and the soldiers and more trusted. But Bernardim Freire also leaved the army and volunteered right after the beginning of the rebellion against Junot and take the command of the improvised army that Wellesley meet in Coimbra after is arrival in 1808.
At the time, the question of the confidence between the «troops» and commanders is complex and is not straightforward; depends on the local circumstances (Lecor force was never attacked by a major French force and Castelo Branco was not the rich and populated province of Minho or a major city as Oporto) the personal character of the commander, the officers of his staff, is orders been know or not, popular influence etc, etc.
In 1809 there weren’t any Juntas in function. After the reconstitution of the Regency they were dissolved.
In 1808, after the first popular anti-french uprises (always made in the name of the restoration of the Prince Regent) in the North and in the South, the armed people became a threat to the dominant classes, in a context of extreme weakness of the state apparatus (no army, the milicia disarmed, the civil magistrates seen as collaborators of the French and disrespected, the capital in the hands of the French; no legitimate central authority);
Quickly the local representatives of the higher classes (such as bishops, noblemen, land owners etc) tried to control and guide those popular movements against the French rule to avoid that they became an all out «revolutionary movement» «à la française»; this was the greatest fear: the emergency of a movement that would destroy the social bases of the Portuguese absolute state.
This was done by the formation of the Juntas i. e. local governments with representatives of all classes. The Juntas were an answer to that state weakness and try to replace it.
Of course, the Junta’s control over the popular movement was always partial and precarious and the price to pay was some temporization with certain «excesses». For example when the Bishop of Oporto meets, in several occasions, mutinous mobs, gently speak to them trying to pacify the situations even after the mob kill or sack.
This was «scary« to everyone and of course the British observers didn’t understand or misinterpreted many events.
When Soult invaded Portugal in 1809, the reinstated Regency hadn’t had the time and the means to improve substantially the political and social situation described above and the fact that the Juntas had been dissolved turn the things even worse.
All over Trás os Montes and Minho the populations try to defend themselves with scarce means and with little support from a few military corps poorly organized and equipped. The result was fear, panic and violence against any voice of reason. Is pressure over officers and soldiers, many of them local men, became irresistible.
The soldiers didn’t hesitated in disobeying orders and forced the officers to do what they think was right; obviously the armed population and the soldiers coming from the same social classes, many times been natives of the land, mixed together in that kind of situations didn’t made «regular armies».
Hope it helps.
Moisés