John,

The light battalion that was involved on the opening day of the war was, together with new light companies that arrived post-Bunker Hill, re-organised into two battalions, which moved to Halifax temporarily after the evacuation of Boston. I don't recall reading anywhere that the original battalion had any particular horn commands (or indeed used horns/bugles at all) in the period from April to August, when the expansion occurred. Some years ago (2004?) Christian Cameron drew my attention to a paper/booklet by an officer named Stevenson who had served in the SYW in Europe - possibly attached to Freytag's or one of the other German corps raised in British pay, outlining "good practice" in operating as light infantry, but this work had almost entirely been ignored or forgotten by modern authors.

It also needs to be stipulated that Howe's exercises, developed in 1774, were for improving the movement of combined formations of light infantry and not focused at all on how light infantry confronted the enemy (Townshend's memo of 1771/72 actually considers that - men acting in two-deep files, one man always loaded, the men choosing their partner, etc). Even by the time of Haarlem, Leslie's brigade was probably still getting used to operating together - reading between the lines, and seeing that Leslie was "replaced" soon afterwards, suggests that they had not done so to Howe's satisfaction. The performance of the light battalions in the 1777 campaign, and their position as part of the Reserve, implies a considerable level of improvement.

Brendan

Brendan thanks.

I confess I am unclear as to the extent of Leslie's role in the fracas on 16th Sept or to the circumstances of his 'replacement' afterwards. He seems to have been given a succession of command responsibilities thereafter. Evidently, though, as you say, the light infantry corps had someway to go before reaching the state of ruthless efficiency seen later. It is interesting that no Light Infantry battalion commander seems to have suffered censure for the errors of the day. I would have thought one or other of these bore a certain responsibility for the errors of the patrol commander. A few Lieutenant Colonels and Majors owed a debt of gratitude to the soldiery and whoever took command on the ground during the main action, for pulling their chestnuts out of the fire that day.

The Stevenson document sounds interesting.

JF