Jean, thank you for an insightful posting - as always - and just as informative as your light-hearted ones are amusing.

A primary problem faced by the French invasion forces, in 1809 and 1810-11, was that of organised (Portuguese) resistance to French reconnaissance and marauding that was additional to, and in some cases more effective than, the operations of the allied army (for example whilst encamped in the Lines of Torres Vedras).

These are further developed notes from some postings I put together in response to specific assertions about “informal” Portuguese opposition to the French and, as such, mainly relate to the third invasion (but are relevant – in the main – to the second also).

1) As you quite rightly point out, the ordenança were recognised “third line” troops operating within and subject to the rules of war. Indeed, from memory, Wellington wrote to Massena to remind him of the similarities with French irregular revolutionary troops. A problem was that on the majority, if not all, occasions the French army were opposed by Portuguese irregular opposition, the troops responded in a quite brutal manner.

2) These responses were both indiscriminate and authorised, as opposed to isolated and unofficial, and documented in both the correspondence and diaries of French officers. The generic term used to describe these patriot soldiers was "villagers" or "country people", paysans, and “armed villagers” paysans armés, although there were some who preferred bandits banditti . This latter term is clearly and totally inappropriate in the context of the war in Portugal. Given the number of times these terms appear, the French were undoubtedly faced with a most effective and coordinated opposition by the Portuguese - on both sides of the Minho in 1809 and the Côa in 1810.

3) In my opinion this spirited and sustained opposition is a significant factor to take into account in delaying, disorganising and harassing the French invasion forces in both 1809 and 1810. After accounting for the difficulties in terrain, the weather and the lack of subsistence, the main opposition the French faced in the initial days of both invasions that of well-organised Portuguese ordenança and volunteers.

4) You’re also correct in that their organisation, deployment and tactics were not an impromptu Portuguese response to the second invasion, due to lack of regular troops, or a British (or even Anglo-Portuguese) policy in 1810. After recruitment to the first and second line troops, all eligible males in each locality were liable for duty in the ordenança. Moreover, many of the exemptions that had formerly been in operation were, by 1810, no longer in force.

5) Finally, by 1810, given the extent of recruitment and the state of emergency in which the country was in, almost all of the male townspeople and villagers, between the ages of 18 and 60, would have been liable for service under Portuguese law. And, for a time at least, a "nation in arms".

Best wishes
A