While one can debate the extent to which Nap viewed his soldiers as mere expendable tools to achieve his ends and what right he had to use troops of other nationalities, broadly I agree with you. From my own studies and reading on the era it does not appear to me that Nap was overtly biased towards the French troops or that he exploited the soldiers of other nations, including the Poles, disproportionately to his own. The exception was the Guard, but there were notable Polish (and other) troops in that elite body, one sign at least that Nap recognised their skill and bravery and did not view them all as inferior 'throw away' soldiers. There are some recorded comments of his that express a preference or greater concern for French troops over others, but I think it would be unnatural if he did not to some degree, and any such views do not appear to be unduly reflected in the actual use of the soldiers.

It has been said by many that Nap was very unfair to the Poles, in that he was willing to use them as soldiers yet never granted them the status of a self-ruled kingdom. However I think that it is important to remember that prior to 1807 no-one was willing to give them anything meaningful in the way of territory or self-determination. The Grand Duchy was a big step forward for the Poles and probably as big a one as Nap could have achieved in trying to establish a lasting peace with Russia at Tilsit. While the Duchy no doubt served Nap's own ends in serving as a buffer state between Russia and central Europe which gave him both power and influence in that area, I am not so cynical as to think that he did not in some measure recognise the right of the Poles to their own land and rights and was acknowledging their help and support in the Eylau-Friedland campaigns.

Given Nap's desire to avoid upsetting Alexander and the Russian elite it is difficult to see how he could have established a Kingdom of Poland without causing a war or at least serious unrest with Russia. Any ambition to create a kingdom had to give way to the greater matter of relations between Europe's two premier states. It is unclear whether or not Nap would have actualy created an independent Polish kingdom had he succeeded in 1812.

Regardless it is unquestionable that Nap placed his own ambitions and plans before those of the Poles, or pretty much anyone else for that matter. Whatever genuine respect and sympathy for the Poles and their situation he had, it was always subservient to his own ends, and he admitted as much to Caulaincourt and others. Should it have proved useful to create a Kingdom of Poland then he would have, and the opposite is equally true. Certainly in 1812 he exploited the Poles' hopes and ambitions by using the creation fo a Polish kingdom as one of the major justifications for invading Russia, above and beyond its true value in his calculations, thereby encouraging many Poles to serve in his army. Despite the monumental failures and losses of that campaign, it is notable that so many Poles still fought under Nap, some right to the end and well after they were under any forceful obligation to do so, as they still looked to him as their patron and best hope for a Polish state. Whatever its true purpose and the reasoning behind it, the creation of the Grand Duchy was not forgotten, and while it did not itself last long, it must be considered an important factor in Poland's long struggle to remain an independent nation-state.

The relationship and the resultant fruits of the connection between Nap and the Poles is certainly one of the more complex and interesting aspects of our already fascinating era.

Regards,
Chris