Hello John

You make some interesting points about the lack of major generals with the Duke of York - it is certainly a topic worthy of more research. I am not sure I buy the administrative only role you refer to for the battalion commanders leading brigades by seniority. The brigades could be in action at any time and normal seniority rules would surely apply. Wellington himself said that from October to January on the Waal he only saw David Dundas once.

Regarding Boxtel, Sherbrooke was apparently keen to emphasise his role as commander of the 33rd while Wesley was in command of the brigade, if we are to believe the account dictated to his daughter in law in 1830.

For the 44th Foot, I have seen a transcript of a so far unpublished letter from Sgt Major William Roworth who describes how his brigade marched with Abercromby on the night of the 14th/15th, significantly he also describes the positions held by the French infantry, which implies that the 44th weren't simply guarding the route back to Berlicum.

This is all thin gruel, but my conclusion is that that Abercromby took the bulk of the 3rd Brigade with him. Frankly for Abercromby to consider attacking the main body of the French army, which was headquartered at Boxtel, with only three quarters of the Guards brigade, beggars belief and inherent military probability.

All the best

Garry

Some time later- Garry hello.

'Thin gruel'- indeed! appropriate for the subject.

Regarding Major Generals and brigades, there is, as you say work to be done. As far as the limitation of lieutenant colonels responsibilities in command of brigades, it is fair to make a distinction between being a conduit for orders from HQ and reports from battalions, supervising re-supply and enacting orders for line of march, etc, and actually commanding the brigade in action. The evidence suggests that in the three principal field engagements in which Third Brigade- or elements thereof- fought (Boxtel, Tuil and Meteren/Geldermalsen) the force commanders were closely involved with running the battle from positions up forward.

We can wrestle with the tantalisingly elusive evidence re. Boxtel and how close or dispersed the battalions might have been, but at Tull (despite his mobility problems) Dundas was far forward, having created ad hoc brigades, mixing and matching the battalions, to balance his force (This would continue to be a feature of the British stand on the Rhine as battalions became non-effective). At Geldermalsen, elements of Third Bde were deployed in depth with Dundas up forward dealing directly with the battalion commanders. It's possible that Maj Gen Laurie, the Light Brigade commander, was at Dundas's side to give assistance with the infantry battle (rather than supervise the light cavalry's ambiguous contribution) but there's no evidence that was the case.

It may be stretching a point but it seems worth noting that after Boxtel Abercromby complimented Wesley on the performance of his regiment, not his handling of a brigade as an inexperienced lieutenant colonel. Similarly, tradition has it that after Geldermalsen Dundas not only singled out the 78th for special mention in his dispatch but warmly complimented lieutenant colonel Mackenzie on the contribution of his regiment for having "saved the British Army"; that is to say, rather than for the overall success of the brigade under his command in repelling the French attack- (and saving the British Army).

An interesting aspect of the brigade command arrangements in HRH's army following the arrival of Moira's reinforcement in the summer, is that once Third Brigade was assigned to the Reserve under Abercromby at the end of August, it appears to be the one brigade that was consistently lacking a Major General in effective command during the rest of the campaign, Balfour's involvement never being other than nominal. I wouldn't want to push that point too far without further investigation but it suggests to me that the role of the Third brigade in the Reserve was to provide reliable battalions that could either take the field together under the force commander or be deployed where they were required, which meant the presence of a Major General in effective command would have been the waste of a scarce resource, while lieutenant colonel could perform the basic administrative functions required of a brigade commander.

As far as the possibility of the brigades being in action at any time during the autumn, once the British had taken up a position behind the Waal and dispersed to their cantonements, the belief seems to have been that the French, as exhausted and ragged as the allies, would be unlikely to attempt an attack, a view that young Wesley shared. My impression was that his comment regarding Dundas- who had no authtority over the Third Bde at that time, being GOC of a brigade of heavy cavalry behind the Lek, was an indication of Dundas' zeal rather than his negligence.

Regarding Sherbrooke and his command of the 33rd at Boxtel when repelling the French cavalry bearing down on the Foot Guards, given that there is no mention in the anecdote of Wellington's location, commanding the brigade or otherwise, should we not consider the possibility that the 33rd was divided into half-battalions- as at Meteren/Geldermalsen- and that Wellington was with the other 'wing' and regimental HQ elements?