Hi Susan,

I have followed Dupont's career in some detail prior to his departure for Spain. At Marengo he was Berthier's chief-of-staff and then he led an infantry division through the 1805-1807 campaigns with great credit. Certainly from what I have read, his career was expected to go very far and a marshal's baton was not out of the question.

I think if you look at Joseph's invasion of Andalusia in 1810 you can see why Dupont fared so badly. From 1805-1807 Dupont had led some of the finest infantry in Europe. From what I have seen, the troops sent to Spain in 1808 were not in the same category; in fact many were foreign auxilaries (inc. Italians) pressed into French service. When Joseph marched into Andalusia, he did so with some veteran divisions (Ruffin's division was the one Dupont had formerly commanded in the Grand Armée). Joseph's army then spent two years trying to crack Andalusia, which it failed to do. In fact, after two years the guerrilla campaigns against the French were even better organised and more widespread. Hence I think people's expectations of Dupont in 1808 were unrealistic.

Looking at things from Napoleon's point of view, I can understand why he was so upset. Bailen burst the bubble of Napoleonic invincibility. This was the high-tide mark of the Empire and I do not believe things were ever the same after Bailen. It gave heart to the British, which in turn motivated Austria, which led to a two-front war Napoleon could not ultimately win.

I don't believe the average French soldier was physically much different from other nations; nor do I think French soldiers were much differently armed, or even that they had some tactical system which was unstoppable. I believe the French were victorious because their willpower was greater; their commanders were young and vigorous and hungry for success. They had this belief that they were better - and more to the point, their enemies appeared to lack this same sense of common purpose and self belief. At Bailen, Dupont is the first senior general to say 'I've had enough' - there was nothing left in the tank and he just stopped. Was this because he was physically / mentally exhausted by war, or was it because he did not believe in the mission?

Certainly from reading his journals in 1805/6/7 you see a man motivated and at the top of his game. Look at Haslach in 1805 - completely outnumbered by the Austrians leaving Ulm, Dupont saw his only chance of salvation was to attack. Look at Durnstein, Halle, Friedland; here was a man who could motivate his men to achieve extraordinary things.

A year after Friedland he surrenders. Why the change?

My own opinion is when Napoleon was not present on a campaign, the army did not have the same level of buy-in for the mission. Napoleon was not 'watching them' - he was somewhere else and those troops who were with him would receive the lionshare of the credit, rewards, promotions, etc. This means the prime motivating factor (the promise of reward) is absent, therefore that special factor which made the French successful is also absent.

When my book on the 9th light infantry comes out next year, you will see how the morale of the troops Dupont led from 1805-1807 goes through the floor from 1809 onwards when they are in Spain away from their Emperor. Same leaders, same weapons, same tactics - constant defeats!

Terry