I agree. “From 1807 to 1814, Napoleon tried to conquer and hold Portugal and Spain against the combined efforts of British, Portuguese, and Spanish troops. The war was a turning point in the history of four countries: it revolutionized Portugal and Spain and helped to consolidate British global dominion and to diminish French power. This is not an easy story to tell. A scholar must have command over an enormous body of evidence drawn from English, French, Portuguese, and Spanish sources, and must also have a flair for military narrative, because warfare is central to everything that happened in the Iberian Peninsula. Charles Esdaile qualifies on all counts, and his work sets a new standard for the history of the war.”

But Tone, just prior to this, asserted that “Esdaile also discusses Napoleon’s political and military strategy in Iberia, the failings of his generals, and other themes commonly covered in any history of the Peninsular War. What will be new to most readers is Esdaile’s somewhat perverse insistence that the Peninsular War was a mere sideshow of little military importance in the defeat of Napoleon, though a central event in the history of Spain, something he takes care to underscore in his skillful analysis of the political and social revolution unleashed by the resistance to Napoleon’s occupation of the Peninsula.”

The main thrust of Tone’s critique within the review is, I believe, contained within that paragraph – my italics. But, in order to understand this critique, if you have not read the entire book - maybe only dipped into certain sections – I suggest it would be necessary to read, very carefully, the final chapter Báscara in full. Even if you have read the whole book, I would suggest careful re-reading of the final ten pages or so, from 499 onwards.

Tone’s critique is itself also, I would submit, in part a rejoinder to some of Esdaile’s conclusions in “Fighting Napoleon” rather than those he puts forward in “A New History”. But Tone at least concedes that a further strength of Esdaile’s work is his command of the “political”, the “social” and, although it is not stated in this review, also the “economic” structures in place and their development between 1808-1814 – for example the issues and implications of “la desamortización”. Without some understanding of “struggle” at these levels, in my opinion, it is impossible to try to understand the military conflict in Spain fully.

Spain, as you yourself have pointed out in other posts, was not a homogenous society in the late 18th and early 19th centuries. Rather, the heterogeneous nature of Spain, taking the predominant sector of the economy, agriculture, as but one example, gives rise to many and varied socio, economic and political structures. One of the reasons why the cortes in Cadiz could not be anything but different to the court in Madrid. And it is true, as you point out, that Ferdinand, on his resumption of power, reversed a number of advances made during the period 1808-14 whilst retaining others. However, the process of political, economic and social reform, and democratisation, once started is difficult to stop – entirely. Even if there are a few hiccoughs along the way and it takes almost two centuries to complete.

In my opinion, the point that Esdaile is making is not that Spain (or Portugal, for that matter) was not important - either in terms of wider European politics or in deciding the fate of Napoleon - Napoleon would still have been toppled. Rather, he argues that what happened in Spain was of much greater consequence to Spain itself.

Both cited passages from Tone, JL (2004), Review of Esdaile The Peninsular War. H-France Review Vol. 4 (March 2004), No. 30 - Charles Esdaile, The Peninsular War: A New History. New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2003

Best wishes

Anthony