a large amount happened between 18 and 29 June. There is no way that one can draw a meaningful comparison between the actual status on the 29th and the continuation of the trends that had been in place up to the 18th. I personally think that Napoleon's analysis from exile was in large part butt-covering PR, but there is an indication of the plan and the resources. One must discount the projected results by typical results in other periods of extensive mobilization. There are some useful projections of what might have been accomplished, such as in Houssaye, and analyses of what had actually been accomplished to the outbreak of war, such as in Regnault.

My view is that, if left alone, Napoleon could have fielded a sizeable army, but that the Allies had no intention of allowing him that time. I think all parties also knew that the Allies could win a contest of attrition, so Napoleon was obliged to seek a series of decisive battles, but that each such battle also affected his manpower. In 1805-09 Napoleon only had to fight one or two opponents at a time, and he could do so on their turf. In 1813-15 he was trying to fight everyone at the same time, and there was another four months of good campaigning weather to come.

I am not at all surprised at how quickly the bubble burst after Waterloo. Part of that was many of the personnel at the depots or in process simply went home. An example of how severe desertion was is in the numbers of the Armee du Nord - 55,000 on June 29th. Since it started at about 124,000 it had lost about 69,000 men. If we assume casualties from 14-18 June at 30-40,000, then the remaining 30-40,000 had just walked away. It must have been even easier for personnel in depots and with many of the National Guard battalions, not in the midst of a large army, to melt away.

It would be interesting to comare the 20,000 regulars in Paris not from the Armee du Nord to the number of regulars in Paris before June 18th. My memory is always suspect, but I think Houssaye has a figure that is higher. That would be a useful calibration of a force with no campaign losses, only desertion.

The reality was that Napoleon was engaged in a confidence game and that any reverse was bound to have a huge effect. The earlier the reverse, the greater the impact.

David