Can you comment on the roads in the Antwerp - Breda - Eindhoven - Maastricht quadrilateral? I'd like to know if the roads available now were as relatively important then. It has always seemed to me that if Antwerp was in decent repair and properly garrisoned (which I think Wellington did address), then he would be able to operate from the Breda-Eindhoven area with secure flanks and maintain communications with the Prussian army operating from Aachen through Maastricht. While that would surrender the central position, either army could retire easily when threatened and as easily advance if Napoleon attacked the other. The longer they could keep Napoleon bogged down, the more time the other armies would have to advance through eastern France. Antwerp had proven very difficult for the Allies to take, and offered equal advantage to the Allies in 1815. Also while holding Antwerp, Wellington had a tete-du-pont across the Scheldt and therefore a broad range of options. I do not see that losing Brussels made the position of the Allies that difficult. I also don't see that Napoleon could have held Brussels even if the Waterloo campaign had gone perfectly. Let's say he had destroyed the Prussian I and II corps on the 16th, and then let's say he had managed to run Wellington to ground and maul his army, within a month (if not sooner) he would have been obliged to move the Armee du Nord south east to deal with the Russians, then Schwarzenberg. What would happen in Belgium then? In order to safeguard it, Napoleon had to crush the Prussians, then defeat Wellington so soundly that he had to evacuate or fall back to Arnhem and the Kingdom of the Netherlands collapsed. With anything less, the Allies would be back in Brussels as soon as Napoleon headed for Champagne. In short, so long as Wellington and Blucher could keep forces in being, I don't see that the French incursion into Belgium would be lasting.

I remember us having a very interesting discussion when I visited you in Leuven about Napoleon's options on the 17th. As I recall, I suggested that there was merit in him thrusting directing from the field of Ligny via Wavre and Leuven on Mechelen. It was a subject that you had also considered for years, also with reference to the Neerwinden campaign and I found it very interesting to compare your observations on the two campaigns. Perhaps you would consider an article for the website about the military geography of the area at the time to illustrate what the movement corridors were and demonstrate why campaigns over several centuries had followed the same routes. I took the opportunity to drive many of the roads in the Brussels - Leuven - Namur - Charleroi quadrilateral with your comments in mind.

Can you also comment on the available crossings of the lower Rhine and the potential (and obstacles) for the Prussians to adopt a more northerly LOC if needed, for example via Wesel and Eindhoven instead of Koln to Aachen? I would like to explore the Prussian options for extending the campaign after a reverse in Belgium.

Next time I am in the region I would like to look more closely at the roads towards Mechelen and Antwerp from Leuven. I'd also like to see the field at Neerwinden.

Regarding your point about if Grouchy had been able to succeed at Wavre, I have sometimes wondered at the mess Blucher would have been in if Napoleon had driven Wellington off the Waterloo position. The risk was substantial.

Regards,

David