I have a fotocopy of Hudson Lowe's report somewhere, so thanks for the offer, but I don't need the transcription;

I can't see Wellington retreat out of reach of Antwerp; For centuries the control of Antwerp was regarded as Great Britain's most vital interest on the continent. If he retreats beyond Maastricht, he has the Maas and its marshes between his army and the Netherlands, that means he has to go up to Arnhem before he gets to a good bridge that allows him back into the Netherlands. And he is de facto in enemy lands. The people of the Rhineland had not digested that they were now Prussians or occupied by the Prussians and were in no mood to support the Allies. Also, what happens to his Dutch contingent ? The Dutch were not used to conscription; They had been buying Germans to fill the Dutch conscript numbers till 1811-1812. I'm convinced Wellington believed that they would evaporate if he retreated out of Holland. So his options are very simple : two days marching from Antwerp and keep Dendermonde covered with the troops he had left in Flanders. Waterloo was as far as he could go.

So that leaves him with a retreat to Brussels (undefendable) and from there to Aalst-Dendermonde, or to Brussels on to Mechelen; no use to keep Dendermonde occupied if the French flank him by getting to Mechelen before him. He can't cover Mechelen from Waterloo. The Prussians must cover the roads to Leuven if he is to make a stand at Waterloo. So I agree with Ron that the lynch pin is on the Louvain position. Fighting is Belgium is always about control of Leuven. But there were French as far as Ottenburg. 15 km from Leuven. So if Grouchy had managed to push the Prussians over the Dyle (that flows from Wavre to Leuven, to Mechelen), the Allied goose would have been very much overcooked. It all depended on the Prussians standing and holding at Wavre, at the risk of the British army being annihilated. As you know for me the real Waterloo enigma is why the Prussians did it.

Cheers,

Bruno