Here is some criticism of Bernadotte that you might want to take into consideration:

From Napolwon’s Conquest of Prussia 1806 by F. Lorraine Petre, 171-173:

‘The absence of Bernadotte from Jena as well as from Auerstadt is inexplicable, except on the ground of his own selfish and jealous character. Never had a commander a better chance than he had of turning a hard-won success of a fellow-general into an easy and overwhelming victory; but then the laurels must have been shared with Davout, which was not what Bernadotte could bear, especially as the lion’s share would have fallen to Davout. The Emperor’s orders are not forthcoming in the original, which must be admitted to be prima facie suspicious. They are, however, clearly given in Davout’s history of the operations of the 3d corps, and Davout is generally reliable and honest. The orders were addressed to him, and he says they ran: ‘If Marshal Bernadotte is with you, you can march together; but the Emperor hopes that he will be in the position indicated to him at Dornburg.’ These orders Davout says he communicated to Bernadotte in writing. Bernadotte himself admits receiving them at 4 am on the 14th. (See his dispatch of 21st October-Foucart, ii, 200.) On the other hand, he ignores the order to march with Davout if he was still himself at Naumburg, and confines himself to an exposition of the difficulties of getting from Dornburg (where he arrived at 11 am on the 14th) to Apolda. Looking from the Saale up the valley leading from Dornburg to the plateau, there seem few difficulties, certainly none such as Soult had in the Rauthal. Besides, we know that Hohenlohe on the evening of the 13th went down to Dornburg with a brigade and up again, all in a few hours, apparently without any difficulty. What Bernadotte says might seem to point to the absence of any such order to march with Davout. The Emperor answered him on the 23d October (Foucart, ii. 243) as follows: ‘However, according to a very precise order, you ought to have been at Dornburg, which is one of the principal passages of the Saale, on the same day as Marshal Lannes was at Jena, Marshal Augereau at Kahla, and Marshal Davout at Naumburg. In case you had not executed these orders, I had informed you during the night that, if you were still at Naumburg, you should march with Marshal Davout and support him. You were at Naumburg when this order arrived; it was communicated to you; but, nevertheless, you preferred to make a false march in order to turn back to Dornburg, and in consequence you did no find yourself in the battle, and Marshal Davout bore the principal efforts of the enemy’s army.’ To that letter Bernadotte could have replied, if the case were so, that the orders to support Davout if both were at Naumburg had not reached him. He did not do so, and the presumption must therefore be that he did receive them, as Davout says he did. The orders were certainly clear enough, and it seems impossible to find any excuse for Bernadotte’s reading the latter part, merely expressing a hope that he was at Dornburg, as a direction to march at that late period by a circuitous road, instead of by the straight one to Apolda.’

‘It is on these despatches, written within a few days of the event, and not for publication, that the affaire Bernadtooe must be judged, and they seem conclusive against him.’

‘The utterances of St Helena and the statements of memoir writers are of much less value though perhaps worthy of record. Napoleon, at St Helena, in his notes on the memoirs of Bernadotte, says that marshal demanded to lead the way if he marched with Davout. The latter objected that, Bernadotte’s corps being in the rear of him, it would cause confusion if it passed to the front. Bernadotte insisted on having precedence, on the ground that his corps was No 1 while Davout’s was No III! With reference to this last astounding statement, it is noticeable that in Berthier’s dispatch of 21st October 1806 (Foucart, ii. 186), conveying the first written censure of Bernadotte’s action on the 14th, he says the Emperor ‘is not accustomed to see his operations sacrificed to useless points of etiquette of command.’ Napoleon added, at St Helena, that he had signed the order for Bernadotte’s trial, but had withdrawn it on personal grounds (Memoires pour server, &c., viii. 215). He had no particular affection for Bernadotte; in fact, he disliked him, though he admitted his ability. But it will be remembered that in his youth he came very near marrying Bernadotte’s future wife, and he always had a strong affection for her.’

From The Campaigns of Napoleon by David Chandler, 495-496:

‘If Napoleon was only doing justice to Davout when he awarded him unstinted praise for his great achievement, the Emperor was certainly justified in venting his full wrath against the commander of the 1st Corps. Not a man of Bernadotte’s command had so much as fired a shot all day, very largely due to either sheer incompetence and lack of imagination on the part of the Duke of Ponte Corvo, or more probably to sheer professional jealousy. Bernadotte undoubtedly received his copy of Berthier’s order, sent out at 10 pm and forwarded to him by Marshal Davout, which ordered him to move with Davout if the 1st Corps was not already at dornburg as previously instructed. In spite of the fact that Bernadotte was still at Naumburg when he received this order (as he freely admitted later), he chose to disregard its content-and Davout’s reiterated appeals for assistance. He insisted on implementing to the letter (but hardly the spirit) Napoleon’s earlier order moving him to Dornburg. Even this maneuver was carried out in the most slipshod fashion, and the 1st Corps took all morning to reach Dornburg (arriving there about 11 am), and then spent a further five hours covering the eight miles to Apolda, arriving there after the battle of Jena was over. When Napoleon demanded an explanation of this amazing conduct, Bernadotte tried to justify himself by describing the difficulties (largely imaginary) which he had encountered along the road…His misconduct almost cost the marshal his head.’

From Swords Around A Throne by John Elting:

‘[Bernadotte] also was furiously ambitious, apt at intrigue, and gifted with an overwhelming talent for obfuscating evidence. In 1799 he was first ambassador to Austria (the Viennese mobbed him out of town), then somehow Minister of War (his unrealistic strategic inspirations soon caused the Directory to accept ‘the resignation I have not given’)’-127

‘…[Bernadotte’s] extreme caution always played against his oversized ambitions. That caution served him well in 1802. Placed in command in western France, Bernadotte cooked up a mutiny among troops awaiting shipment to Haiti but took care to be in Paris when the shooting was scheduled to start. The plot was detected; Bernadotte protested that he knew nothing of it and so wiggled free.’-127

‘He served well enough in 1805, but in 1806 he deliberately disobeyed orders, waiting between Napoleon’s battle at Jena and Davout’s at Auerstadt, hoping that one or the other would meet disaster. His services in 1807 were unexceptional; in 1809 Napoleon gave him command of the Saxon contingent, but Bernadotte was in a carping mood, which passed into open insubordination. The Emperor sent him back to France.’-127

‘Tall and dashing, with alert button eyes and a fine beak of a nose, Bernadotte showed remarkable bravery in action and was a competent tactician. He could outbrag Augereau or be convincingly charming to people who might be useful to him. He had fine moments, as in 1790, when he faced down a Marseilles mob to save his colonel. But he trusted no one and was himself untrustworthy-able, but always the enemy of his superiors.'

Sincerely,
K