As already pointed out - we had a very long and extensive discussion on napoleon-online.de about the vicitmization of the Prince de Ponto-Corvo, amonst else a discussion of "Mephisto" with John Cook, which might be worthwhile to be presented here as well.

Dear John,
Thank you for the invitation.
I am turning to you again to ask you some questions regarding your article.
We are discussing Berndadotte in general.
The main allegation against him is his failure to take part in either of the battles on 14th of October 1806.
We / I would like to ask you for your statement regarding:
Quote:
„Corps was not at Naumburg; it was approaching Dornburg“.“
“Bernadotte concentrated his I Corps at Dornburg, in accordance with his orders, where the last of it arrived at approximately 1000 on 14 October.”
“Ultimately, he placed his Corps where Napoleon wanted it to be, at between 1000 and 1100 on 14 October 1806.”

According to the order written on 13th 10:00 p.m. received on the 14th, 3:00 a.m.
1. Both were told that the date of battle was shifted from 16th to 14th October.
Correct.

2. Bernadotte’s corps was not where the Emperor expected it to be at Dornburg.
Incorrect. See the previous orders since 12 October. It was expected to be at Dornburg on 14 Oct 05, not during the night of 13/14 Oct 05. Bernadotte was expected to be at Naumburg on 13 Oct 05, which he was.

3. As speed was essential now he got the option to move together with Davout or continue.
Yes but moving with Davout was not practical for the reasons given in the article. Marching back through Naumburg and putting two corps across the Saale at Kosen was, in my view, not a practical proposition. The roads are simply not good enough for two corps and Bernadotte would have had two choke points to contend with – Naumburg and Kosen. It would also have left the route Dornburg/Naumburg open to the Prussians if they chose to retreat by that route and, at that time, they were all supposed to be above Jena accepting battle. Nobody realised it was just a rear guard and that the main body intended to retreat via Auerstedt/Naumburg.
The answer to most of this is in my article.
Bernadotte received no orders at 0300. The order received at 0300 was to Davout.
“The Emperor has recognised a Prussian Army which stretches a league away before and on the heights of Jena as far as Weimar. He proposes to attack it on the morrow. He orders Marshal Davout to proceed to Apolda in order to fall on the rear of that army. He leaves the Marshal the choice of his route, provided he takes part in the fight.”
Berthier added:
“If Marshal Bernadotte is with you, you can march together, but the Emperor hopes that he will be in the position which he pointed out to him at Dornburg. It is very necessary that he should be there”.
Point 1: Berthier' Post Script confirms that Napoleon expected Bernadotte to be at Dornburg on 14 October and at Naumburg on 13 October. This is a confirmation of Bernadotte's previous orders sent on 12 October at 0400 and via Murat on 13 October via Murat at 0900.
Point 2: Bernadotte is expected to be at Dornburg during the course 14 October, not the night of 13/14 October. Orders for the next day were usually sent out for the next day's march towards the end of each day with the intention that they reach the recipients overnight. It is perfectly clear that the 0300 message to Davout anticipates that Bernadotte will be in the vicinity of Naumburg in accordance with his previous orders. This is exactly where I Corps was expected to be on the night of 13/14 October – Naumburg not Dornburg. The correspondence is quite clear on this.
Point 3: Moving with III Corps was not, in my opinion, an option for the reasons I give in the article. Davout and Bernadotte took the most practical routes available to them, in my view, particularly if Bernadotte was to arrive in Dornburg on 14 October a place where it was "very necessary that he should be". This is absolutely clear and unambiguous. In order to arrive at Dornburg via Apolda I Corps would also have had to pass through III Corps. The route Bernadotte took to get to Dornburg was the shortest, quickest and most practical one by which to execute the unequivocal orders he had received directly and by proxy over the previous 48 hours. Even today the routes chosen by each corps commander would not be practical for the passage of two corps.

According to the message N expected both to start right away.
A reasonable assumption – 'as soon as possible' would be a better interpretation in my view. It took a corps up to 4 hours to get moving, typically approximately two hours. Davout and Bernadotte were expected to be at Apolda and Naumburg during the course of 14 October. Davout's main body started to move at approximately 0600. I don't know what time Bernadotte started to move but we do know from Dupont that I Corps had great difficultly getting across the Saale.

He expected D to start from Naumburg and he expected Bernadotte to start from Dornburg.
Correct only for Davout. Absolutely not for Bernadotte. See all the orders starting with Napoleon's time over distance study written on the night of 12 October. If you use this argument Davout should have already been Apolda not Naumburg. An impossibility in both cases under the circumstances of the orders they were both given over the preceeding 48 hours.

He definitely did not expect anyone to arrive there that evening and the less the next morning at 11:00o’clock!!!
Yes he definitely did! Both corps were expected to be in Naumburg on the night 13/14 October. The message was sent to Davout at Naumburg at 0300 on the night of 13/14 October and anticipates that Bernadotte will be there. Furthermore, it is written, in the context of Bernadotte and Dornburg, in the future perfect tense which implies expected completion in the future, in other words during the course of 14 October. Furthermore, Berthier had already sent an earlier message at 1500 on 13 October to both men at Naumburg. So that, clearly, is where both corps commanders were expected to be at the end of the day's march on 13 October.

Davout started right away with his Division Gudion to secure the bridge towards Kösen (4:00). He crossed the Saale as soon as possible for he knew that the battle would take place soon.
The last of I Corps was not on the move until about 0600, the advanced guard, I think, moved at about 0400, but that is typical for such a large body.

What did B do? Was he not in a hurry? Did he not grasp the situation? Did he not see the necessity of a swift movement?
My view is that Bernadotte grasped the situation very well, which is why he did not follow Davout. To do so would have left the Dornburg route open for a retreating Prussian army.

Should he not have foreseen the waiting period behind Murat and that he would never be able to make it under this condition in time for Apolda on the 14.10.???
Murat? I do not understand this point. The reserve cavalry was behind Bernadotte, as I remember. It did not cross at Dornburg but proceeded to Jena, arriving late for the battle. Bernadotte was not ordered to be at Apolda. He was in time to be at Dornburg on 14 October as he was ordered to be.

I think he was aware by then that N expected him to be in Dornburg and furthermore that the date for battle has shifted from 16.10. to the 14.10. (the very same day !)?
Yes. In Dornburg during the course of 14 October. If he was expected to be in Dornburg on the night of 13/14 October, why did Napoleon assume he was in Naumburg when he sent the 0300 orders to Davout?

Question: Do you really think someone could possibly read this message as if B should arrive in Dornburg on the 14th?
Yes, that is what his orders say. The message sent to him earlier on 13 October and to Davout at Naumburg, and all the previous messages during the previous 48 hours show this to be the case. I and III corps were expected to be in Naumburg at the end of the day's march on 13 October. I do not see how I Corps could have crossed the Saale and arrived in Dornburg on 13 October.

Pls consider: the battle was not intended to be there!
Which battle? Only one was anticipated. No battle was expected to take place at Apolda either yet that is where Davout was sent. I and III corps were they encircling and blocking corps while Napoleon fixed the Prussian army.

Napoleon described the area near Weimar and not Dornburg!
I do not understand this point. Napoleon had, incorrectly, identified the Prussian main body above Jena. Dornburg and Apolda closed the Prussian line of retreat of what was thought to be the main body.

Quote: “Davout determined to march west and approach Apolda from the north, rather than via Dornburg. Why, one wonders, did he choose this route? “
I try to answer this question in the article. It was the most practical route for III Corps.

Perhaps he had a proper understanding of his own task: to get into the rear and not the flank of the enemy while B had been intended to strike the flank according to the original plan.
Perhaps D moved out that quickly (4:00am) because he intended to take part in a battle while Bernadotte was not that much interested.
Davout intended to place his corps at Apolda as ordered. This is speculation in the context of Bernadotte for which evidence does not exist as far as I am aware. Both men executed their orders to the letter – Davout and the Prussians blundered into each other in the fog at Auerstedt unexpectedly – this was an unplanned encounter battle between a single corps and the Prussian main body.

He preferred to march / wait behind Murat and to stick with the original plan (order from the 12th10.). He was not really willing to rethink the situation.
Murat approached Jena via the town of Jena – see above. Napoleon's marshals were not expected to think but execute their orders in accordance with Napoleon's plan, which he usually did not divulge to them in much detail until. That is why they were given their orders on a daily basis at the end of a day's march, being told where to be at the end of the next day's march.

Question: What do you think?
See above

Quote: “Morand's Division of III Corps, it should be noted, did not arrive at Auerstädt until 1000”
“…he does not appear to have marched at a pace significantly different from Davout's formations”
Gudin was at 7:30 Hassenhausen
This means that the first Division needed 3 ½ hours including the crossing of the Saale and the defile at Kösen. 04:00-07:30 / 13km / 3 ½ hours?!
The distance Naumburg to Dornburg is 23km.
You assumed that B’s corps was on the way between N and D.
Correct. This is not an assumption. I have yet to discover exactly where Bernadotte's divisions bivouacked on the night of 13/14 October. We know where Davout's were. There was a battalion over the Saale at Kosen, elements as far north as Freyburg to observe the Saale crossing there and the route to the north. The remainer of III Corps was west and south of Naumburg. Napoleon accuses Bernadotte of turning back towards Dornburg from which I infer that they were south of Naumburg on the night of 13/14 October - Maude infers the same and I agree – somewhere along the road to Dornburg. Had I Corps not been between Naumburg and Dornburg Napoleon could not have accused him of turning back towards Dornburg.

So the distance for his first division might have been much smaller.
Possibly. But distance is not the only criteria in these things and we need to identify the precise locations of Bernadotte's divisions on the night 13/14 October to come to any firm conclusion. This is a gap in my knowledge at the moment.

At 7:30 - Where was Bernadottes Advance Guard then?
Not sure. But I only say 'perhaps' in the article. We do know, however, that the Prussians had already identified French troops in Dornburg.

According to your article his Advance Guard must have been close to Dornburg.
I think that is a reasonable conclusion but I say 'perhaps'.

Were they still approaching?
Who? The advance guard or the main body?

Approaching they did, but did they do this all night long?
If I knew that I would have said so in the article. Until the receipt of the order to Davout at 0300 I assume that they were resting as was III Corps. Do you know?

No, they rested!
So what? So did III Corps until the order to move was received.

For how long did they rest?
If I knew that I would have said so in the article. Do you know?

Did B perhaps start later than D?
If I knew that I would have said so in the article. Do you know?

When did they (Advance Guard) arrive?
If I knew that I would have said so in the article. Do you know?

4:00(+/-?)-? /<23km/ ? hours
Did they halt at Dornburg to wait for Murat’s corps to cross the Saale at first?
Murat? I don't understand this point. Dornburg is on the other side of the Saale. Murat didn't cross at Dornburg and followed behind I Corps, as I remember, proceeding to Jena,

What did they do then? Did they cross the Saale only to wait for the rest of the corps or did they start for Apolda?
The advance guard? Bernadotte had no orders to move to Apolda.

If so, why did they arrive there that late: 11:00-16:30 / 13km / 5 ½ hours?!
Who are you talking about? The advance guard or the I Corps main body? As far as I can tell, I Corps was across the Saale in Dornburg, where it was ordered to be, by approximately 1100/1200.

Why did he do all this?
Do what? I speculate about the reasons for the slowness between Dornburg and Apolda in the article, but it is no more than that. To elaborate, his subsequent moves towards Apolda were slow and the leading elements of I Corps didn't get there until about 1630 - agreed. I don't know why this was so and there are a number of possibilities. It is only possible to speculate. In the first place, Bernadotte had no orders to move to Apolda and Napoleon did all the thinking for his marshals. Bernadotte was probably in a position where he could hear firing from two battles when he expected just one, furthermore, he had been told by the Napoleon that it was 'very important' that I Corps be at Dornburg, but without any explanation why. So, he could only guess but I think his appreciation of Dornburg's important to Napoleon's actions was right. As Bernadotte pushed towards Apolda at probably around mid-day, give or take, the firing at both would have been starting to decrease I think. The situation would have probably been unclear to him and giving him the benefit of the doubt, in the absence of orders, I suspect he was over-cautious or undecided, or both. The Prussian army had a fearsome reputation so perhaps he was justifiably cautious - for all Bernadotte knew, I Corps might have been the only intact formation in the French army. To be honest, I don't think it is likely we will ever know the real reason but I doubt it was deliberate treachery or cowardice – one thing Bernadotte was not was a coward, as evidence by his performance in the Revolutionary Wars and later in the 1806 campaign.

Why did he not hurry up towards Dornburg or Auerstedt like Murat and Davout did?
Murat again? Murat approached the battle via Jena. I don't agree, necessarily, that Bernadotte didn't reach Dornburg in reasonable time bearing in mind the fog and the crossing at Dornburg, which we know from Dupot was particularly difficult. He appears to have been across the Saale at Dornburg by approximately the same time III corps was complete at Auestedt – similar distances. Bear in mind III Corps' divisions were not bivouacked in Naumburg itself.

Was he waiting for Murat to cross the Saale at Dornburg before him?
Murat? Murat approached via Jena town and didn't cross at Dornburg.

Kind of a traffic jam, wasn’t it!?
It would have been worse if Bernadotte had followed Davout. Two corps through Kosen? Not a good idea in my view.

Morand was on the battlefield right in time at 10:00 at Hassenhausen.
Yes. III Corps was complete at Auerstedt at roughly the same time I Corps was complete at Dornburg – approximately the same distance. But "right in time" assumes that the battle of Auerstedt was anticipated – it was not. Not by anybody. Neither Napoleon, Davout, nor Bernadotte knew that the Prussian main body was retreating.

This means that the last Division to enter the battlefield needed 6 hours for 13 km (latest start / waiting time included) including the crossing of the Saale and the defile at Kösen.
You are assuming that the entire corps move at the same time and all elements of it crossed the Saale together. This simply did not happen. Typically the head of the column of a corps did not move for approximately two hours at the earliest, sometimes longer, preceeded by the advance guard. You also have to remember that Davout was not anticipating meeting the Prussian main body – Napoleon told him it was at Jena. His divisions arrived at Auerstedt at approximately one hour intervals, give or take.

Where was Bernadotte then? At 11:00 (+/-) his last units crossed the Saale.
Yes, I think so. I have not yet found precise times for the movement/arrival of each division. But your point is not clear to me.

Distance (assuming they were really at Naumburg by 4:00 am): 4:00-11:00/23km/7 hours.
It would not be possible to place an entire corps in Naumburg. When documents talk about a corps being in a particular place they usually mean the corps HQ. Davout's was spread out over the area between Naumburg and the Kosen crossing, and to the north. Bernadotte's was apparently south of Naumburg, the exact location of the divisions is unclear. III Corps main body didn't move until about 0600, as I remember, the advance guard moving out at about 0400 apparently, making contact with the Prussians at about 0730. If you look at the times it took to get a corps moving after receipt of orders (in Foucart) it is anything between two and four hours. I do not know when Bernadotte ordered I Corps to move on the morning of 14 October, or when the head of his column started.

But they were not on a battlefield, were they?!
So what? What battlefield were they supposed to be on in your view? Had Bernadotte pressed on towards Apolda and the Jena battlefield immediately after crossing the Saale he would still not have got to Jena in time to make any difference to the outcome with the drift of the fighting towards Weimar – his leading division perhaps at approximately 1200 at the very earliest. Foucart does an interesting time over distance analysis which demonstrates this.

Both times (Naumburg:Dornburg and Dornburg-Apolda) Bernadotte’s troops did not meet the requirements. He did not meet the requirements.
I do not agree. He was ordered to be at Dornburg and that is where he was. He actually met all the requirements of Napoleon's precise instructions. Moving on to Apolda was Bernadotte's own decision.

Question: Do you agree?
See above

“…it can be doubted whether he would have arrived at Auerstädt in time to make any difference”
Morands troops (arrival 10:00 according to your article) could have been followed by Bernadottes troups.
They could have but Bernadotte chose to follow his orders.

Even if they had arrived at – let’s say - 12:00 it would definitely have made a difference especially in consideration of Davout desperately in need of cavalry to perform a proper pursuit.
Not really. Davout would either have been defeated or have won by 1200. Anyway this is all wisdom after the event. Nobody expected a battle at Auerstedt. You are assuming Bernadotte had the kind of foresight that is just unreasonable.

Question: Don’t you agree?
No. Not at all. You assume that Bernadotte was able to predict Auerstedt. This is wrong, nobody could predict it. It would have been quite impossible for all of I Corps to have arrived by 1200 anyway, just possibly a division, and only if Bernadotte had chosen to ignore his orders to go to Dornburg. Moreover, we know that, allegedly, Suhac asked to turn round and march to the sound of the guns at Auerstedt – according to Savary anyway, who was not present. So we can only infer that Bernadote was on the march towards Dornburg already. If he could hear the guns at Auerstedt we may assume that he could also hear them at Jena. Even if he could not, as you point out yourself, Napoleon had already identified, incorrectly as we now know, the Prussian main body above Jena. So, Bernadotte was right to proceed in accordance with his orders, which were quite clear "the Emperor hopes that he will be in the position which he pointed out to him at Dornburg. It is very necessary that he should be there”.
It seems to me that Bernadotte had a very clear idea of the importance of Dornburg which is why he chose not to follow Davout.

The Bibliography is incorrect.
You are writing about „The Campaigns of Napoleon“ written by D.Chandler comparing it with the compendium „Jena 1806“ but you do not list this book in your bibliography.
No I didn't list it. It didn't feature as source material for the article.

This leads me to the assumption that you knew the book and it’s content but you did not want to discuss it. Is it because it is 100% contradictory to your Defence of Bernadotte?
Read the title of the article. It is only concerned with exploring the 'defence'. The opinions of Chandler in Campaign of Napoleon are not relevant in this context. Furthermore, rather than be influenced by the opinions of secondary authors the article was based on primary material as much as possible.

Question: Am I right with my assumption?
No, you are not right but my focus was essentially on primary material where possible, not secondary ones.

Quote: “Furthermore, Chandler, in his Jena 1806 (in which, incidentally, he is far less scathing about Bernadotte than in his Campaigns of Napoleon) also suggests…”
In a compendium there is no space for in depth discussion of details.
Do you mean Campaigns of Napoleon?

He is nevertheless NOT less scathing. He is just not wasting too much time for it.
Well, we will have to disagree on this. I have re-read what he says in Campaigns of Napoleon and his Jena and I still consider that Chandler is much less scathing in the latter.

This is the meaning of a compendium., being a short summary.
If you mean Campaigns of Napoleon that is exactly why it has no value as a source.

Actually he is insisting on the points he made already before in his „Campaigns“.
Therefore Chandler writes:
„It is just possible (but no more) that B in fact crossed the Saale at Kamburg.“
He does not give it a very high probability.
Neither do I. I merely mentioned it as a possibility as he suggests it in Jena and I give no more weight to it than Chandler does.

Question: Would you agree?!
See above

The Prosecution’s case“ is – in comparism to the Defense Case – much too short.
…,and it actually ends with a sentence belonging to the defence.
It was never my intention to examine the prosecution case. It is too well known and I merely summarised it.

Quote: “Ultimately, between Dornburg and Apolda, he moved slowly, that is undoubtedly true, and the reason for this has never been satisfactorily explained.”
Why is this not part of your prosecution???
Simply because, even if I was 'prosecuting lawyer', which I was not, he cannot be 'prosecuted' for something he was not ordered to do. This move was on his own initiative. I tried to suggest why this might have been slow. Read the title of the article.

Both points lead me to the assumption that you really did not intend to discuss the prosecution properly.
Correct. Read the title of the article it was concerned with the 'case for the defence'. In that context it is not me to discuss the 'prosecution' or a matter of discussing the prosecution 'properly'. The 'prosecution case' is very well known, as evidenced by your questions, and has been accepted by English language historians and repeated without any examination for decades. I merely summarised it. My singular object in writing the article was to present the case for the 'defence', which has not been done in English before, as far as I know, though it has in French as early as about 1900. I was only presenting the case for the defence, that is clear enough from the title I think.

Question: Am I wrong?
See above

I apologize the bluntness of my presentation of my critizism.
No apology necessary.

I sincerely hope you do not feel offended.
No – not at all.

I want it to be understood as a critizsm of Bernadotte’s behaviour and not of you.
Fair enough, but have you actually examined the primary material, rather than just accepting recycled received wisdom?

I look forward to a straightforward response.
I suppose the answers I have given above might not be those that you want but they are, I hope, clear enough.

It is a matter of honor to publish it on the german Napoleon online discussion forum without reservations.
Why? Anybody is entitled to disagree with my conclusions. It is certainly not a 'matter of honour' for me. As far as I am concered the primary evidence, essentially the orders, are conclusive enough but there may be more primary stuff out there I do not know about – I would certainly not claim that a short magazine article is definitive.

Thank you very much in advance.
You are very welcome, and if you are able to provide any additional primary source information to fill the gaps in our collective knowledge I would be very grateful for it.

Soweit die Email-Diskussion zwischen Mephisto und John Cook ... chapeau an die Beiden für diese sehr offene Aussprache.