Here Palmer, who comes to a very different assumption as Petre / Chandler and sees the whole affaire Bernadotte in a more compley view :

Alan Palmer, "Bernadotte - Napoleon's Marshal, Sweden's King", John-Murray-Verlag 1990:
...
"Bernadotte missed both battles, thereby incurring the sternest censure from his Emperor, and with good reason. Early on the previous afternoon - Monday, 13 October - Murat and Bernadotte entered Naumburg, a small city on the right bank of the River Saale, within sight of the battlefield of Rossbach where, six years before the Marshal was born, Frederick had (as he wrote) 'saved the reputation and honour of the nation' by a great victory over the French. The two Marshals knew that Napoleon anticipated a battle in the same region of Saxony, although not until Wednesday. Some three hours after reaching Naumburg Murat received orders to bring his cavalry as swiftly as possible south-westwards to Dornburg, sixteen miles away, with Bernadotte's slower moving infantry and artillery following him. Murat left almost immediately and, six o'clock on Monday evening, Bernadotte sent a message to Berthier informing him that, as his men were weary from their five days of marching, he would set out in half an hour, make the journey in easy stages and be at Dornburg by daybreak. Neither Imperial Headquaters nor the two Marshals themselves appreciated the difficulties of the rocky terrain, espacially around Dornburg, an overgrown village, dominated by three separate hilltop castles. Murat's cavalry did not reach the battlefield of Jena until after midday on Tuesday."

(...)

"Yet if Bernadotte had adhered to the timetable he outlined to Berthier, all would have been well, even though the battle was fought a day earlier than anticipated. However, shortly before eight o'clock on Monday evening, he received a visit from Davout, who was bivouacked four miles away, near the bridge across the Saale at Kosen. There had been a change of plan, Davout informed him: fresh orders would be sent from headquaters in the morning. Bernadotte therefore decided 'to halt my troops where they are and await further commands', as he wrote to Berthier. At 3 a.m. Davout heard from Imperial Headquaters that he was to cross the Saale and take the read to Apolda, where he could fall on the enemy's rear should the Prussians pull back from Jena: 'If Marshal Bernadotte is to be found with you, you might march together. But the Emperor hopes that he will be in the position which he has indicated to him at Dornburg', wrote Berthier, ambiguously. Davout rode over to I Corps headquarters again but Bernadotte firmly rejected any suggestion they shoud 'march together'. He reverted to the original plan of a (somewhat belated) night-march down Dornburg road, for his men were already astride this route which, if left uncovered by troops, might have provided the retreating Prussians with a line of escape to Leipzig. Strategically it made good sense for Davout's III Corps to cover the left bank on the Apolda Road and Bernadotte's I Corps to guard the right bank."

(...)

"No one could foresee on that foggy morning how, after marching a mere five miles from his bivouac, Davout would stumble across the main Prussian army at Auerstädt. Nor could anyone anticipate that Bernadotte would have such difficulty in getting I Corps through the narrow Saale defiles that he did not reach Dornburg until eleven o'clock. By then Napoleon was heavily engaged at Jena, and Davout in danger of defeat on his left flank at Auerstädt."

In case - both Belliard and Dupont - who were along with the Prince de Ponte-Corvo on the spot - did not accuse him of being slow or deliberatly not supporting Davout.
Booth also agree on the difficult terrain at the Dornburg area.