Maida must have looked trivial to Napoléon.

Surrounded as it is by the immense glory of Ulm, Austerlitz, and Jeana, Maida does look "trivial" and "peripheral;" however, not all agree with that assessment. To believe Maida is trivial is to believe that Sicily is trivial and, from there, that control of the Mediterranean is trivial, as must be possession of Constantinople and even India. As Napoleon stood triumphant in Berlin, he knew full well that in spite of all the glory, it didn't get him a foot closer to Constantinople.

Protection of Sicily was the key strategic goal of Pitt's last campaign: the campaign of Trafalgar.

The campaign of Trafalgar, by Julian S. Corbett (1910)

Conclusion:

(p.421)
It (Craig expedition securing Sicily) was the last stroke of the Trafalgar campaign — and fitly so ; for it was the central point around which it had turned. Little as seemed the gain in the midst of the vast continental struggle, it was enough ; and Napoleon knew it, as was quickly confessed, although for a while he believed that the removal of Pitt’s firm hand from the helm would enable him to do with England what he would.

(p.422-424)

At the Foreign Office the change was as complete as at the Admiralty, and here lay Napoleon’s chance. In the desperate condition of affairs the King had at last to accept the services of Fox. The office he selected was that of Foreign Secretary, and, as was only to be expected, no sooner was he fairly seated than he tried to snatch a peace. Napoleon seemed equally willing. Within a fortnight of Pitt’s death Fox was in direct communication with Talleyrand. By May regular negotiations were established on the basis of uti possidetis. But the rock they split upon was Sicily. Fox, it is true, in his fanaticism for peace, did his best to throw it away. There was a period when Napoleon might have had it on excellent terms, but he let the chance go by in the intoxication of his success, and then it was too late. It was a piece of mad perversity. But for Napoleon, at the zenith of his power, the one fragment of success (Sicily) that was left to England in Europe was unendurable to the pride which had been so completely humbled at sea. His first orders to Joseph on his accepting the crown of Naples had been that he was immediately to seize Sicily. He had merely to throw troops across in the confusion that reigned, and the thing would be done. Apparently Napoleon’s own failure had taught him nothing. So far from being able to carry out his brother’s order, Joseph had not yet succeeded in possessing himself of Calabria. Supported by a squadron under Sir Sidney Smith, Gaeta was still flying the Bourbon flag, and the “brigands“ were holding out in the hills. Napoleon kept urging more energetic measures, but though General Reynier was operating in the mountains with 7000 men, little solid progress was made.

In view of the secret negotiations with Fox, the delay was exasperating, and the pressure on easy-going Joseph grew stronger. “The English,” wrote the Emperor in the middle of June, “are willing to recognise you as King of Naples, but without Sicily they will refuse to recognise you. Peace could be made if you were master of Sicily.’’ Joseph’s answer must have been galling in the extreme. Craig had gone home on sick leave, and Stuart, left in command, suddenly threw some 5000 of his men across the straits, and assisted by a naval brigade from Sidney Smith’s Squadron, inflicted a severe defeat upon Reynier at Maida. It was the first time Napoleon’s troops had crossed bayonets with the British army, and they had been beaten by an inferior force. To add to the vexation of it and the loss of prestige, the whole of Calabria was immediately in flames. A strong counter-movement set in against Joseph, and so far from his being able to seize Sicily, it looked for a while as though he were to lose his crown as suddenly as it had been gained.

From that day till the end of the war in 1814, every effort of Napoleon’s to win the heart of the Mediterranean was fruitless. It remained in British hands till the last to mark the justness with which Pitt’s great campaign had been conceived. He had failed to save Europe, but he had secured the British Empire. Beside the vital outpost in Sicily he had won another as valuable in the south. By the middle of January Baird was in full possession of the Cape. These two positions were the solid return of the unmatched work which Pitt’s Admirals had performed at sea, and together they rendered the Empire impregnable.