Thanks for another interesting and informative post.

I would like to know, however, whether the conclusions that you have reached are based on accounts of the Battle of Albuera, or are just your own opinion based on regulation and normal practice within the French army in 1811.

While I do not doubt that this could have been the intention of the French, I would be surprised if such a neat approach would have survived the intervention of Colborne's brigade on the right of Zayas.

For me, the brief snippet that we have from Maransin is, at best, very ambiguous and to base any conclusion on the French formation and subsequent manoeuvres on this is tenuous to say the least. If we accept that Maransin was descibing a formation of individual battalion columns for the second division, we also have to consider Lapene's statement regarding one of these brigades:

"Colonel Praefque, of the 28th Leger, leading regiment of the column, is mortally wounded, as are all its superior officers....The 103rd Ligne, the regiment immediately behind the 28th in the column, and like all Girard's corps, exposed successively to the same dangers and to the same losses, after useless efforts to gain ground, were obliged to yield to the numbers of the enemy, and to the superiority of his fire."

What conclusion can we draw from this? Lapene speaks of a single column, not individual battalions, and clearly the 103rd are behind, and not in line with the 28th.

I am sure that Oman was wrong about the French formation, but we are still no closer to an accurate idea of what actually occured.

Best regards

Mark