The regency council was, as far as I am aware, solely concerned with the government of Portugal. Its remit, again as I understand it, was to respond to anything that was serious and required immediate action – anything else was to be referred to the court in Rio de Janeiro. To understand Portuguese politics correctly there is a need to understand the tripartite nature of foreign policy – between London, Lisbon and Rio de Janeiro.

De la Fuente writes, “In his instructions to the regency [council] of January 2, 1809, prince João stated that all matters that did not require immediate and prompt attention, and all those referred to them by the kingdom’s tribunals, be they for university promotions, granting of benefices, or promotions in the army or militia, and all other matters dealing with administrative reforms in political, ecclesiastical, military or maritime affairs were to be referred to the appropriate ministry at Rio de Janeiro. All military appointments were to be considered provisional, until confirmed by the Prince Regent.” De la Fuente, p 95 citing Torre de Tombo, Ministerio do reino, livro 380, Ordem of Jan 2, 1809.

I am still working through de la Fuente’s thesis, but as I understand it, it is the very inactivity in 1809-10 that prompts the opposition (or critique) of the work of the regency council and attempts to change its composition. However, de la Fuente demonstrates that the very same political intrigues both undermined the authority of the regency [council] and underpinned its critique. The suggestions for change, from a Portuguese perspective, were to expel specific members of the council. The British perspective concurred with a reduction in the number of members of the council, and the expulsion of those associated with the arrival of Junot and subsequent French military rule.

The British ambassador, or rather “plenipotentiary extraordinary” to Lisbon was, at this time, initially Sir John Villiers and later Charles Stuart. Lord Strangford was his opposite number in Rio de Janeiro - but I think he had also served previously in Lisbon, indeed wasn’t he instrumental in the removal of Prince João and the court to Brazil? Dom Domingos de Sousa (Coutinho?) was the Portuguese ambassador to London and one of his brothers, I believe, held a post at Rio 9i do not know which for the moment without detailed examination of my notes).

By July 6, 1809, the regency [council] was reduced to three members namely” the bishop of Porto, now elevated to the [position of] Patriarch of Lisbon, the monteiro mor, the marquês das Minas. These three had the support of Canning and D. Domingos de Sousa. However, Canning wished to have Wellesley (Sir Arthur) or Sir John Villiers appointed too. The appointment of Wellesley was acceptable, in Portugal and Brazil, but he was only to be admitted to the council for matters relating to the military and [its] supply. To this end, he was named C in C of Portuguese forces – i.e. technically above Beresford.

De la Fuente argues though that although the “Sousa faction” got their way with the [three Portuguese] appointed members, it was not so successful in relation to the secretaries – all of whom retained their positions (Forjaz and Araújo). I may also add that it should be noted that both Forjaz and Araújo held office prior to 1807 and had made some very useful contributions to improving Portuguese (military) administration, albeit not always successful, and supported specific military reforms. These reforms fell prey to vested interest. Unlike the three appointees to the regency [council], who Villiers denounced to Canning as “old, inexperienced and had nothing to recommend them”, were much younger, more able but shared some of the taints of pro-French sympathies for which the former council members were expelled.

This period and subject requires careful treatment. I think it could be argued that the British did not oppose the appointees as they were “controllable”. Certainly, also, a further consideration was the need to placate the conde de Linhares. In fact, I think I’m correct in thinking that Castro does not (ever) take his seat at the council. And, despite his opposition to the French as bishop of Porto, taking into account the actions of his brother, he could hardly claim to not have family and political ties that were tainted by pro-French sympathies. So too, I believe, the monteiro mor – who, initially at least, was not enthusiastically anti-French in 1807-08. It is also ironic that those people who were most strongly anti-French and pro-British included Forjaz who political and familial loyalties were inextricably linked to the pro-French faction (even after 1808?). To put it in a nutshell, there was a need to tackle vested interest, and to ensure the supremacy of pro-British sympathies at both Lisbon and Rio de Janeiro in order for British foreign policy and intervention in Portugal to succeed.

This takes us up to p 98, the year 1809/1810, the end of my notes thus far and my limited understanding of the subject matter. I will return to this work later in the year or perhaps even January 2009 and make some printed photocopies (from the microfilm) to help - as it is decidedly complicated.

Best wishes

Anthony