I would like, if I may, to take up two of the points you raise in your post and make a third of my own. I hope that, like your own highly valid postings, they are seen as making a constructive contribution.

Firstly, you write …“Soldiers, by the order of their commanders, and such other subjects as may obtain express permission for the purpose from their sovereign, may lawfully exercise hostilities , and are looked upon by the enemy as lawful enemies; but those, on the contrary, who, not being so authorized, take upon them to attack the enemy, are treated by him as banditti; and even the state to which they belong ought to punish them as such.”

In order to answer this assertion, I would like to refer to the actual process of mobilisation of the Ordenança – specifically during the third French invasion 1810-1811. Firstly, it is necessary to understand the role of the recruiting district and the position of the ordenança within this geographical – or more specifically – juridical area; the “comarca”.

The capitão mor exercised all responsibility for military recruitment within the “comarca”. All males between specified ages were liable to recruitment to the military – actual recruits being drawn by lot. A proportion of those drawn by lot were liable for service in the first line, infantry, cavalry and artillery, a further proportion liable for service in the milícia and a final proportion liable for service only within the ordenança. Service within the first line was - as I understand it - unrestricted, service within the milícia was (normally) restricted to the boundaries of the province in which recruitment takes place whilst the ordenança were only expected to serve in defence of their immediate locality.

Rather than refer to Oman, it may help to refer to Horward, “Twin Sieges”. Horward, as you well know, is not an uncritical commentator on Anglo-Portuguese strategy and actions in this period. He writes, “To utilise Portuguese irregulars, ancient laws of the kingdown were invoked to call upon the ordenanzas, similar to the French levée en masse. Drawn from the male population between the ages of 16 and 60, these irregular warriors promised to be extremely valuable to the allied cause. The capitãos mores were instructed to organise 250 man companies of ordenanza “to do the enemy all the mischief in their power … by impeding his communications, by firing upon him from the mountains and strong passes with which the whole country abounds, and by annoying his foraging and other parties that he may send out”. “. See p 31. Reading, in full, the letter from Wellington to Leite, to which Horward refers in the passage above, confirms that the Portuguese are to be used solely in a defensive manner. Indeed, how could 250 man companies of irregular and poorly armed troops be used in any thing other than relatively strong, defensive positions?

Continuing with Horward’s account, we find that Bacelar, the Portuguese commander of Beira (Alta), was told to prepare for invasion, instruct his companies of ordenança to guard and watch the bridges and fords on the Côa. It is these types of units that Massena complained about in relation to the incident with Pavetti. If you read further, you will also see that both Montbrun and the Portuguese “renegade” Alorna agree that Portuguese civilians on the Spanish / Portuguese border were maltreated by French forces. And this is prior to the invasion proper getting under way!!!

Secondly, you write … “While Wellington could try to assert that such authority had been granted the Ordenanças in the end he turned to asking the French for more humane treatment of the Ordenanças”

The ordenança had been mobilised correctly, as defined by the laws of Portugal, and should have been afforded the “rights of war”. I do not have the document to hand at the moment, but there will be a royal decree to this effect. I will consult Soriano or Chaby to locate it – but perhaps one of our Portuguese colleagues can provide us with a reference to the relevant document. Moreover, Wellington at this time is commander in chief of the Anglo-Portuguese forces. He also sits on the Regency Council in matters relating to the Portuguese military and its supporting infrastructure logistics and supplies. His orders were to be respected by the Portuguese as if they were issued by the Prince Regent himself. Wellington I think is not asking for “more humane” treatment of the ordenança, rather I would assert that he is asking for them to receive their due recognition as a bone fide component of the Portuguese military – despite their lack of uniforms. If Massena did not understand the status of this "third line" himself, his Portuguese advisors cetainly would have.

I apologise in advance for any errors in transcription of the following extract of the relevant letter from Wellington’s Despatches.

“Lieut. General Viscount Wellington, K. B., to the Commander in Chief of the French Army (Marshal Massena, Prince d'Essling).
' Au Quartier General de l'Armée Anglaise, ce 24 Septembre, 1810
' MONSIEUR LE MARÉCHAL,
' J'ai eu l'honneur de recevoir la lettre que votre Excellence m'a adressé le 14 de ce mois. ' Ce que vous appelez "des paysans sans uniforme, " "des assassins et des voleurs de grand chemin, " sont l'Ordenanza du pays, qui, comme j'ai déjà eu l'honneur de vous assurer, sont des corps militaires commandés par des officiers, payés et agissant sous les lois militaires.
Il paraît que vous exigez que ceux qui jouiront des droits de la guerre soient revêtus d'un uniforme; mais vous devez vous souvenir que vous-même avez augmenté la gloire de l'armée Française en commandant des soldats qui n'avaient pas d'uniforme. Vous vous plaignez de la conduite de l'Ordenanza a Nave d'Aver envers M. le Colonel Pavetti. La question est seulement si un pays qui est envahi par un ennemi formidable a le droit de se défendre par tous les moyens en son pouvoir. Si ce droit existe, le Portugal est justifié en mettant en activité l'Ordenanza, un corps reconnu et organisé par les anciennes lois du pays. Je peux assurer votre Excellence que l'Ordenanza de Nave d'Aver a bien traité M. le Colonel Pavetti, et il aurait été puni s'il l'avait maltraité. Je voudrais n'avoir pas entendu que malgré que cet officier fût aussi bien traité et par le Capitaine de l'Ordenanza et par moi, la maison du Capitaine de l'Ordenanza à Nave d'Aver avait été brûlée, et que quelques uns de sa compagnie ont été pris et fusillés parcequ'ils avaient fait leur devoir envers leur pays….”

Now, an interesting issue that I had not picked up until re-reading the letter for the purpose of this post occurred to me just now. The actual location of Nave d’Aver, the settlement in which (I think) Pavetti was surprised and captured, is also (I would submit) of importance. Avid readers of accounts of the battle of Fuentes d’Oñoro will recall that this settlement lies on the Portuguese / Spanish border. But it is definitely on the right (Spanish) bank of the Côa. It is often difficult to determine the nationality of inhabitants of specific settlements in many border areas and this area is no different. I’ve seen many variants of name for the nearby settlement that also featured in the above mentioned battle - ranging from Pozo Bello to Poço Velho. Despite the occurrence of the “z” in the first part of the name, the second part of the name – in all variants I’ve seen - is much “closer” to the Portuguese “velho” than the Spanish “viejo”.

This is conjecture, but I (myself) think this may have been a potentially significant factor in determining the nationality of the inhabitants of many of the settlements in this area at this date. Whist the modern road crosses the border at Vilar Formosa, the chaussée at this time crossed the border between Forte Concepcion and Almeida. Moreover, it is necessary to take into account that the line of the Côa is the strongest possible line of defence (both for regular and irregular forces). Indeed, it will be recalled that Crauford was ordered to mine and partially destroy the defences of Forte Concepcion, and retire, rather than let it fall (complete) into the hands of the French, as it lay outside the more practicable perimeter of Wellington’s chosen line of defence. In any case, once the French had captured Ciudad Rodrigo and moved against Almeida Crauford was ultimately compelled to retire beyond the Côa. It is for this reason that the line of the Côa, rather than the area on the right bank of that river, for example the relatively strong position between Fuente Guinaldo / Alfayetes, was chosen as defining the extremity of the allied line of defence. You will recall the fate of Crauford's light division when attacked in force by Ney. However, despite the retreat of the substantive part of the Anglo-Portuguese forces beyond the river, I would argue that any ordenança opposing the French advance, for example the progress of foraging and surveillance parties, in the area immediately in front of the line of the Côa were therefore complying with, and covered by, the commander in chief’s orders.

Thirdly, as the posts provided by our colleague Jorge have ably demonstrated, a further requirement is to understand that there was a great deal of hatred for the French at this time. Much of this derived from the treatment of the Portuguese at the hands of the French in the first invasion (1807-08), but more specially the occupation in 1808, the acts of Loison and also during the second French invasion under Soult. It could be argued, rightly, that popular feeling was not pro British – but it was vehemently anti-French. In terms of high politics the pro French party had all but ceased to exist. Anyone suspected of less than 100% opposition to the French was immediately denounced as a pro French sympathiser, Franc Maçon, afrancesado or simply “traitor” – as reference to just two of the most notorious incidents in O Porto and Guarda in 1809 will testify.

Members of the Regency Council who were tainted (by association or) with having collaborated with Junot in 1808 had been removed from office and replaced with more adamant opponents of the French. We can leave to one side their actual contribution to the work of the Regency Council for the time being. Therefore, the extent and ferocity of Portuguese opposition to the third French invasion, despite the comments of Pelet in his “Campaign of 1810-11”, was therefore totally understandable. It did though come as a massive shock to the French and the Portuguese “renegades” who accompanied the French army of Portugal.

I will review some posts I made relating to the extent of devastation in the wake of the French invasion, as a result of the occupation of the area in front of the lines of Torres Vedras, and directly attributable to French atrocities on the retreat later and re-post them. In my view, Porto de Mos was neither the worst nor an isolated case. There may be a number of underlying reasons for the “congregation” of Portuguese civilians in the church or chapel, the fire and their deaths. But it needs to be viewed, in my opinion, as part of the wider malaise that affected this particular region of Portugal, or more particularly the corridor through and in which the French advanced, halted and retreated.

We do need to look, and I will look, at the extent of straggling. I think this is an important issue – but perhaps not as important as some would suggest in explaining the extent of devastation in the initial stages of the retreat. It is the lack of discipline that is most importtant. This lack of discipline, in my opinion, is most important - the majority of this devastation needs to be related directly to the effects of occupation and the overt lack of discipline at all levels including that of corps and army. But I will also look into Massena’s orders for the advance and referred to within Pelet’s “campaign”. These are I believe instructive. There are explicit orders for the march, to restrict straggling, and for the distribution of rations to obviate the need for straggling and foraging and to prevent disorder. I will look through my notes and post specific references to these up too if they are thought to be of interest.

I think it is necessary to say that I hope this post is not viewed as (merely) Anglo-centric. To support previous posts on this and related subjects I have referred to Oman, III and IV (yes) but also (amongst other sources): Soriano, “Historia” segunda epocha, Tomo II and III and Chaby “Excerptos” (especially vols III and IV).

The posts I propose to provide in relation to the extent of devastation will also be supported by my reading of Oman and Soriano; which combine in my view to provide the best available summary of the war itself and the third French invasion. I do not have access to Blond or Molière at the moment. I will, though, refer to a number of French sources such as Pelet, Guingret, Nöel, and Lemonier Delafosse. The perspective offered by Horward in “Twin Sieges” (and his translation of Pelet) is - albeit fairly well-balanced - essentially pro–French. None of these French diarists / journal writers dispute the extent of devastation or the variety and severity of means by which the French extracted every morsel of food and sustenance they could in Portugal in 1810-11. I have not yet seen Fririon’s journal – but I do not expect it to rebut anything thus far posted – or to be posted.

However, to return to your final assertion - Wellington is not, in my opinion, asking for a "special case" to be made in relation to the Portuguese irregular opposition. This opposition was within the bounds of, and governed by, the accepted "rules of war" as understood by French, British and Portuguese participants in this war.

Hope at least some of the above is of interest.

Best wishes

Anthony