In the spirit of furthering the debate about Bernadotte’s conduct during Jena and Auerstadt, I offer the following summary from Charrier, Le Maréchal Davout (2005) at 198 ff.:

1. Charrier reviews the October 13, 6 p.m. order that Bernadotte received through Murat. That order commanded him to march by his left to Dornburg. One hour later, Bernadotte received through Davout the order for the first and third Corps to march to the cannon, should they hear them, otherwise to await further and imminent instructions. In response, Bernadotte suspended his movement on Dornburg and immediately made this known to Berthier.

2. On October 14, at 3 a.m. Davout received further instructions. Davout was to march to Apolda by a road of his choosing. The order also stated it was very necessary that Bernadotte be at Dornburg, but that, if he was at Naumberg, “vous pourrez marcher ensemble.” Davout went to Bernadotte’s lodging and they discussed this order. Charrier doesn’t know what happened at this meeting, but as a result of it Bernadotte decided to march on Dornburg via Camburg.

3. Charrier says that regardless of Bernadotte’s motives, there were good tactical reasons for making this movement, namely avoiding the Kosen defile. Charrier says that marching to either Dornburg or Camburg and then to Apolda was a reasonable decision. He expresses surprise that Bernadotte’s biographers haven’t justified Bernadotte’s conduct on this ground, but only on the ground that the orders weren’t clear.

4. Charrier opines that Bernadotte acted as a schoolboy caught in a mistake. He hadn’t marched quickly enough on the 12th and 13th so as to be at Dornburg. When he learned how much value Napoleon placed on his being there, he hastened to comply.

5. Charrier then discusses whether or not it was too late to execute the maneuver on Dornberg. Bernadotte began at 4am, but his march was delayed by darkness, fog, bad roads and the fact that Dornberg was encumbered with the last of Murat’s regiments marching on Jena. Bernadotte’s leading division did not arrive at Apolda until 2 pm.

6. Charrier addresses the possibility that Bernadotte might have proceeded to cross the Saale at Camberg.

7. Charrier says that Bernadotte was at Apolda by 4pm with cannon fire on his right and left but he remained there until the next day. He was but 2 and a half lieues (about 8 miles) from Auerstadt.

8. Charrier asserts from personal observation that the Sonnenklappe occupied by Morand was clearly visible to the naked eye from the Apolda plateau.

9. Charrier indicates that Sahuc and Dupont both wanted to march to the sound of the guns at Auerstadt but were prevented from doing so by Bernadotte.

10. Charrier says that Bernadotte failed to answer Davout’s calls for help. He identifies two such messages: The first delivered by Gen Romeuf around 10 am to Bernadotte near Camberg (citing Segur, Souvenirs d’un aide de camp de Napoleon at 306); the second by Trobriand, who encountered Bernadotte about 4:07 at Apolda. Trobriand apparently wrote a letter to Davout's daughter decades later describing his interaction that day with Bernadotte. Charrier doesn’t believe that Trobriand’s letter was a hoax. He found a report of Trobriand’s mission not in Trobriand’s handwriting at SHAT.

11. Lastly he says that numerous people in the army condemned Bernadotte’s behavior and no one defended him. He lists the following officers as critical of Bernadotte’s conduct: Capt. Aubry, Col. Rumigny, Gens. Colbert, Segur, Fezensac, Roguet, Savary, Marbot and Berthezene.

My view is that Bernadotte's decision to march to Dornberg was reasonable. His decision not to march to Davout's aid is more problematic. His troops were tired, having been on the march since the previous evening, but men on the spot -- Dupont & Sahuc-- wanted to march to Davout's aid.

johnw