Kevin:
I have read the same thing you have. Here is my take on it:

From Vachee, 58-59:
'As to Bernadotte, Murat was in a position to set him in the right direction, since they were working together. But, owing to the transmutation of the army, Augereau at Kahla was, every but as much as Lannes at Jena, exposed to an encounter with the enemy, and, as he himself wrote to Lannes on October 13:

'The Emperor had given him no other orders than to move to Kahla.' We can detect in this phrase Augereau's regret that he had not received instructions as to his role. However, like a good comrade, he subordinated his movements to those of Lannes, with whom he was materially and morally in harmony. One cannot say the same of Bernadotte and Davout on the night of October 13-14.

Unlike Augereau, who had no orders and had arrived where he was supposed to be, Bernadotte
1. still had orders to go to the Dornburg,
2. wasn’t there yet, and
3. His last direct orders on the 12th were to support the Grand Duke of Berg, Murat, who was in Dornburg.

So regardless of the harmony that Davout and Bernadotte did or did not enjoy, the situation was not the same at all. I could also add that in the ranking among the Marshals placed Lannes superior to Augereau and Bernadotte higher on the list than Davout… which did count. That also may have played into it.

'Davout, nevertheless, acted with a vigor which we admire, but Bernadotte profited by this silence to remain inactive on October 14 during the two battles which were being waged on his right and left.'

Seems to me Vachee is damning Bernadotte inaction here, not being kind. So your previous reference to Vachee is just a little puzzling.

Nothing in the above two volumes exonerates Bernadotte for his actions, or lack of them, on 14 October.

I am in awe of the way you word things. And I can see why you would be puzzled. I didn’t say Vachee was kind or forgiving of Bernadotte at all. Nor did I suggest that Vachee was wrong in noting Bernadotte's 'inaction'. I didn’t suggest anything ‘exonerated’ Bernadotte from anything. I have simply said that you have no reason to assume that his actions were treachery, aimed to hurt Davout by ‘abandoning him’ or to better his own reputation by his poor performance. And neither did Vachee or Maude. However, I really fail to see how Bernadotte ‘profited’ from the lack of direct orders either in intent or possibility of 'profit', let alone the easily anticipated fallout from his poor performance.

I can’t respond to your quotes from Vachee pp. 259-260 because my copy of his study, Napoleon & The Campaign of 1806 [Originally published as “Napoleon at work”] only goes to p.208.

However, Vachee does write this in regards to the orders of the 12th, pp 56-57 in my edition, 2009:

“The movements of the various corps were thus completely arranged by these brief orders, dictated and sent off between four and five in the morning [of the 12th]. Their tone, the incorrectness of the style, the numerous omissions, the evident rapidity with which they were drawn up everything leads us to believe that these orders were written by officers or secretaries, writing at the dictation of Berthier himself, who had before him the Emperor’s general order, which eh occasionally completed by drawing upon information received verbally and perhaps set down in his green notebook.

In short, these orders, although verbose, contained little: the object of the march, the position of the army, and, in the case of the corps in the front line, instructions to obtain information concerning the enemy. But as to what the general-in-chief himself knew about the enemy , as to the ensemble of the projected manoeuvre and the mission of each corps in the manoeuvre, there is no mention. This, as we know, was the system adopted, and in as much as it favoured the preservation of the secret of the manoeuvre it was an advantage.

On the other hand, the commanders of the army corps were marching in the dark, and could with difficulty show initiative. There was no indication either as to the zones covered whilst on the march or the routes to be followed by each of the army corps. The commanders of the corps themselves chose the roads leading to the destinations fixed for them and sent in the information to imperial headquarters. Moreover, as we have seen, this system of special orders, taken from the Emperor’s general order, lent itself to the multiplication of omissions or fairly numerous errors.”

That is the world that Bernadotte and Davout moved in and the orders and issues they had to deal with..

As for Maude, you quote him:

“There seems no doubt that in the general disposition he had been overlooked, for when the orders dated 10 pm, Jena, were despatched to DAvout, (received at 3
am) directing him to march on Apolda, the Major General added: 'If Marshal Davout is still with you, you can march together, but the Emperor hopes he will be in the position indicated to him at Dornburg.' Now no position had been indicated to Bernadotte, hence he concluded that some order had missed him, and though this note to Davout must have effectively covered his responsibility had he acted on it, he decided to march to Dornburg. Had he acted with energy on his arrival at Dornburg his presence there would have been more effective than his presence at Aeurstadt, hence he does not seem to be seriously to blame. Unfortunately, for his reputation, however, he did not act with anything approaching energy, but carried out his march so tardily that he failed to reach either field in time to render assistance.'

Neither Vachee or Maude find his behavior duplicitous or more than bad judgment and a poor performance. But let’s play devil’s advocate here for a moment concerning motivations:

Let’s suppose that Bernadotte is as bad as you say he was, Kevin, and that Davout knows this and in return doesn’t like Bernadotte.[naturally] Now, let’s assume also that Bernadotte and Davout both know for a certainty how Bernadotte should act in the situation late Oct. 13th. All the conditions as you insist they existed. .

Why does Davout then ask Bernadotte what he is going to do? Isn't the choice obvious, as you insist?

And knowing Bernadotte as the egotistical bad egg that you do, Bernadotte has to be asking himself the same question. Does Davout know something he doesn’t? Is Davout setting him up by asking a question with such an obvious answer? How can he trust Davout to support him with that kind of behavior? Perhaps Davout WANTS the self-serving bugger out of his hair, particularly if Bernadotte is listed higher on the Marshal’s list that Davout? Particularly if Davout wants none of his glory tainted by Marshal screw-up. Perhaps Davout played Bernadotte for the pompous little prat that he was and scared him away.

Kevin, you seem more intent in proving Bernadotte a scoundrel than finding out what he and Davout faced as commanders, either their situations or expectations on the night of the October 13th . Any new information offered is automatically labeled ‘excuses’ or an effort to ‘exonerate’ the man and his decisions on October 13-14th. My interest was in what evidence you believed proved Bernadotte's decisions and performance were aimed at hurting Davout or profiting himself. Haven't see diddlly-squat in that department.

Sorry, finding fault and blame is a rather boring game, though you do always get 'for' and 'against' debates. Finding out what happened and what those men faced is far more interesting, and certainly more enlightening in the long run... and if you absolutely need to blame someone, the new information shouldn't hurt. It also can’t stop you from finding fault. It hasn’t in the past.

Bill