Hans-Karl:
I can appreciate your conclusions here. But consider, Hohenlohe had traveled that same road days before and had made much better time. There is no question that his superiors thought his march was badly executed.

Also - initially the battle of Jena was designed to happen on two days, so for the 15th both Bernadotte as well as Davout would be in an excellent position
to take part and come into action.

That was the general plan, but did Bernadotte and Davout know this?

On the 14th then, Napoléon did beat the four different Prussian army bodys piecemeal, and then at 16:00 the issue was decided - and the battle had
shifted much more to the west than anticipiated and ended in one day. Indeed Bernadotte was placed superbly for the designated pursuite, and he cut
of the line of retreat from Prussian units from Auerstedt, which had to make detours - orientate themselves differently or to get captured.

That was Napoleon's original plan. If Bernadotte had been where he was supposed to be, it was have gone even better...

Bill

"his superiors"? Why do you use the plural form of "superior"? NB was Bernadotte's only "superior", and his assessment of his subordinates' behavior was designed purely to make himself look good - observe his minimizing of Davout's role.

"traveled that same road before and made much better time"? With how many troops, in what weather, after covering how many miles in the previous days ... ?

"original plan"? NB got into a scrape with a fraction of the Prussian army at Jena & thought he was engaging their main force, while Davout blundered unwittingly into the main Prussian army and saved NB's bacon by putting up a stout resistance until FW3's nerve cracked & he ordered a withdrawal. The "original plan" was relegated to the bumf file.