‘I did bring both Vachee and Maude up. I just don't have some of the pages you seem to.
I have found that the "why" is more readily answered when the How, Who, Where, When and What are answered, because they are what lead the participants to why they act. Which means that "why?" may be the most interesting question, but sussing out and understanding the why is very dependent on the other "W's." ‘
The ‘how’, ‘who’, ‘where’ and ‘when’ is readily answered by merely reading on the action and what came before and after.’

Why Bernadotte acted as he did appears to me to be the crux of the issue being discussed.

‘And if I have misinterpreted your posts as attempting to assess blame, then I am glad you have corrected my impression. I will say when you use words like blame, exonerate, fault, kindness, abandoned, and the other trigger words you have sprinkled throughout your posts, that is what led me to that conclusion. [I am more than glad to catelogue them if that would help to see what I am talkng about.]’

The process of historical inquiry is not ‘assessing blame.’ It is to ascertain what happened by whom and why. And if commanders err that needs to be brought to light. It appears that you don’t agree that commanders err and are responsible for their actions. Bernadotte erred greatly in 1806 and the ‘why’ of what he did is essential to understanding the campaign. Commanders are responsible for their actions and that includes both good and bad acts, acting according to what was expected or not, etc.

‘I don't see that 'abandoning Davout' issue being raised by anyone in command. If a division commander suggested spliting my command, countermarching back across my line of march, depending on where in the march column that division was located, [particularly if it was cavalry] onstensibly a difficult march, toreach Davout in time, I might 'firmly silence' the officer, particularly when he hadn't been in command of that division very long. If Bernadotte was frustrated with the march, knowing he wasn't getting to where he was supposed to be, he might be a little testy when a subordinate suggests be given an independent command, the clear implication being that the officer thinks Bernadotte's current efforts are wrong. I would think that would also be the thinking of a soldier and a commander.’

Napoleon certainly believed that Bernadotte failed Davout, as did Rapp and Savary. If you prefer that term instead of ‘abandoning’ that’s fine, but it is also just semantics. Napoleon’s reply to Bernadotte’s letter after the battles were over certainly took Bernadotte to task for his failure to support Davout as well as not getting into action at all on 14 October.

As for Sahuc, he was not part of Bernadotte’s command and had recently been attached to Davout’s III Corps and that is probably why he wanted to countermarch to his assistance. He was under Murat’s command and orders and was merely marching with Bernadotte.

When enemy contact is made, the situation changes and all bets are off, especially if the contact is a meeting engagement as Auerstadt definitely was. Sahuc had the soldierly virtue of wanting to support a comrade. Bernadotte was not hurrying to Dornburg, not did he to Apolda. The excuses put forth in support of Bernadotte about difficult terrain, etc., is just that-excuses-and excuses for failure, and I believe deliberate failure.

‘Who says Bernadotte 'abandoned' Davout? Was that an expectation, or the judgment of some historian a hundred years later? And I'm not talking about line foot soldiers or those who disliked Bernadotte anyway. Did Davout say Bernadotte abandoned him? Napoleon? Any of their senior officers? I see a definite expectation of what he *should* have done on your part, but I don't see it in the words of the participants. Napoleon contemplated courtmartialling Bernadotte. It wasn't for "abandoning" Davout.’

Again, see Napoleon’s letter to Bernadotte taking him to task for his failures on 14 October. Why do you believe that Napoleon thought about court-martialing Bernadotte, if it wasn’t for his failure to support Davout? No one held a gun to Bernadotte's head and forced him to go to Dornburg instead of remaining with Davout and engaging the Prussians. Petre makes a very good point on the subject.

‘I can point out a number of instances during the Jena campaign where the French were 'in contact' with the enemy, including heavy skirmishes, some leading to Saalfeld and other early engagements. However, I don't see that 'abandonment' issue ever coming up as different corps carried out their orders in the face of the enemy.’

Please do.

Bernadotte failed to fight on 14 October. Anyone else do that? Ney busted a gut to get to Jena as did other commanders. Bernadotte failed to do that.

‘It is like Vachee saying that the vague orders 'profited' Bernadotte. He gives a 'why' without every explaining the When, How, Who, Where and What that would substantiate what the heck that mean, other than unsubstantiate Innuendo?’

Then why did you mention Vachee in one of your posts?

‘Let's get away of conclusion statements like 'abandonment' when the When, How, Where, When and Who have not been established from what I can see.’

Why?

If that is the conclusion, why get away from it. By the orders given and the correspondence that followed, and the comments of officers such as Savary and Rapp, there is an excellent case for Bernadotte being guilty of abandoning Davout and ignoring the battle to his rear as he marched towards Dornburg, and taking his time doing it.

It is also a major issue, if not 'the' issue of the discussion.

‘Who says Bernadotte abandon Davout?--the commanders on the ground Where would he have been if he hadn't 'abandoned' Davout vis-a-vis the enemy and the road to Dornburg his troops were already marching on? When did Davout know what the contact meant? What was his conclusions about his need for support, as he had the largest corps in the army? Who made the decision? Did Davout suggest anything else. I find it interesting how prominent that statement is about Davout asking Bernadotte 'regarding' his decision. How was Bernadotte to interpret his orders, orders he had on the 12th to Support Murat, who he knew was in Dornburg, and now had Davout's order that said he was expected there by the Emperor.‘

This is the third time in the posting that you brought this up and its getting repetitive.

Again, read Napoleon’s letter to Bernadotte after the battles were over. He most certainly told him he made a ‘false march’ and did not support Davout.
Davout did not have the largest corps in the army. Soult’s was larger. After the fight at Auerstadt, Bernadotte’s corps was larger than Davout’s.
Bernadotte was definitely ordered to march with Davout and a conscientious commander would have stayed in the area of Naumberg to support his comrade as enemy contact had been made on the 13th.

Davout figured out quite early what contact with the Prussians on his outpost line meant. It is described very well on the Esposito/Elting Atlas. Davout undoubtedly figured out what the contact meant when he found he was facing a larger force than he had at his disposal and Bernadotte had already 'left the building' and would not support him.

‘I also am not sure how Davout had Prussians behind him. He was moving south and west towards Auerstadt. He went to meet the Prussians. He didn't wait for them to come to him. Why? Because he believed they were moving west and north, away from him. A pursuit, rather than some threat where Bernadotte was abandoning him to the Prussian Main army. That was supposedly around Jena where Bernadotte was ordered to go, where Murat was. I am trying to see how Davout was abandoned. Each commander had their orders.’

Where did anyone say that Davout ‘had Prussians behind him’? I must have missed it. I don’t believe that is an issue. Davout found Prussians driving in his outposts on the afternoon of the 13th and believed that it was the precursor of a major Prussian force coming in his direction (which would be traveling to the northeast by the Prussians).

Davout moved to meet the Prussians because he had to cross key terrain in order to face the Prussians (ie, the Kosen defile). There was not a pursuit late on the 13th or early on the 14th. Auerstadt was a meeting engagement. To be blunt, Davout was hunting the enemy pursuant to Napoleon’s plan and the orders he had been given.

Bernadotte’s orders to move to Dornburg were given earlier than the 13th, and he was expected to be there on the 13th. However, he believed his troops to be fatigued and stopped to rest at 1400 on the 13th when he should have kept going to Dornburg if he was going to obey his orders. Halting early on the 13th and not pushing on to Dornburg was a violation of his orders. And Davout had marched farther than Bernadotte had and was outposting his front while Bernadotte sat on his hands and after the receipt of the new order at 0400 on the 14th which directed him to move with Davout, he decided on his own to obey the orders that were now out of date. And the fact that Davout was in contact with the Prussians should have alerted Bernadotte that action was imminent. His continued march to Dornburg effectively isolated Davout on his own and can be interpreted as abandoning Davout.

Sincerely,
K