Kevin:
Thank you for the information. I have read that in Bressonet.

First, the order reads 'can' not 'could.'

:-7 Well, however it is translated is it not a directive to do it, but something that 'can' be done if desired.

Second, the intent of the order, as well as the spirit in which it was written is perfectly clear. If Bernadotte was not in Dornburg as ordered, he was to march with Davout. Bernadotte clearly failed in his mission to get to Dornburg and then disobeyed orders by not marching with Davout.
And Bernadotte was already supposed to be in Dornburg by the 13th, not Naumburg. So, again, with the situation changed, and Bernadotte's assigned objective not reached, Bernadotte should have marched and fought with Davout.

So now Bernadotte was supposed to be in Dornburg by the end of the 13th, not march there on the 14th.

Perhaps the following will be helpful. I have found it so. The following is from Napoleon’s Apogee: Pascal Bressonet’s Tactical Studies 1806-Saalfeld, Jena, and Auerstadt, Translated and Annotated by Scott Bowden,
122-124:
‘On 13 October, while in Naumburg, Murat and Bernadotte received at four o’clock and at six o’clock in the evening, respectively, the first of the Emperor’s orders, and had decided to being marching towards Dornburg, when the arrival of the message for marechal Davout, written at three o’clock in the afternoon, halted the 1st Corps’ movements. Bernadotte worte to the Major General the following letter:

Naumburg, 13 October 1806, eight o’clock in the evening ‘Marechal Davout has given me at this minute, Monsieur le duc, your letter of today, brought by M. [lieutenant] de Perigord, your aide-de-camp; according to its content, I have though it necessary to stop the movement for which I accounted in my previous letter, dated of this evening at six o’clock, since you ordered marechal Davout to maneuver to the enemy’s left only if marechal Lannes was attacked this evening near Jena, and you added that if the attack did not occur, he will receive the Emperor’s instructions for the next day.
Since I believe that these measures will be inclusive of all [the corps], I stopped my troops where they were, and I wait for new orders.

I am still with my entire corps around Naumburg. I am ready to execute the movements that the Emperor orders.’
As for Murat, having received at four o’clock the two messages that had been sent to him at seven and nine o’clock in the morning, he did not hesitate to go to Dornburg; not having been affected by the message which stopped Bernadotte, Murat reached Dornburg fairly late and personally went to Jena during the night.

The night of the 13th to the 14th was spent in Naumburg by marechaux Davout and Bernadotte, who were waiting for the Emperor’s orders. These orders are not recorded in the registry [also known as the Journal] of the Major General.

So, on the night of the 13th, before 3am, Bernadotte's Corps was marching to Dornburg, and Bernadotte was in Naumburg with Davout.

We know them only through what is said in the Journal des operations du 3e corps, which is quoted here:
‘Early on the 14th, marechal Davout called his divisional generaux and other officers to Naumburg in order to give them their orders, pursuant to those that had been received from the Emperor during the night. The orders from Napoleon arrived at three o’clock in the morning; they were dated the 13th, written at ten o’clock in the evening and dispatched from Imperial Headquarters on hills overlooking Jena. The Emperor, who had scouted a Prussian army that stretched over one league in front of and on Jena’s hills up to Weimar, had planned to attack the next day. He therefore ordered marechal Davout to move towards Apolda, so that his corps could fall upon the rear of that army. He left the choice of the road up to the marechal, as long as he took part in the battle. His Serene Highness the Major General [Berthier] added: ‘If marechal Bernadotte (Prince of Ponte Corvo) is with you, you can march together, but the Emperor hopes that Bernadotte will already be in his assigned position at Dornburg.’

‘

So, the most recent orders stated that Napoleon wanted him in Dornburg. Maude, Vachee and others acknowledge that Bernadotte had not received direct orders to do anything other than go to the Dornburg, but as it was the most recent orders, Bernadotte attempted to be where he was supposed to be. He tried to satisfy the Emporer's hopes...

Marechal Davout distributed the orders to all his generals, who left immediately to carry them out; then Davout went to see Beradotte, commander of the 1st Corps, who had indeed arrived in Naumburg during the night. The Marechal gave him written notice [emphasis added] of the orders he had just received from His Majesty, and asked him to declare what he was going to do.

So, even Davout saw this message of Napoleon's open to interpretation, rather than an obvious, and militarily required choice as you seem to imply.

Bernadotte told Davout that he would not move towards Apolda with the 3d Corps, but would instead march for Kamburg [and from there, on to Dornburg}.’
Both marechaux had therefore received the order to go to Apolda, sur les derrieres de l’ennemi (against the rear of the enemy, emphasis in the original), marching together in case Bernadotte was still in Naumburg.

No, both marechaux had not received the order to go to Apolda. If they had, if the message received by Davout had been viewed as such an order, why would Davout have ask Bernadotte what he was going to do instead of how he was going to march with Davout?

Bernadotte had not received any other order, otherwise he would have mentioned it in his explanatory letters to the Major General, dated 14 October from Apolda, and dated 21 October from Bernberg. ‘It was only at four o’clock in the morning’, he wrote in the letter, ‘that I received your letter to marechal Davout which said that the Emperor really wanted me to be in Dornburg.’

Berthier’s letter to marechal Davout was very clear: ‘If marechal Bernadotte is with you, you can march together, but the Emperor hopes that he will be at his assigned position in Dornburg.’ For anyone obeying the spirit of military matters, it is clear what the quote.

Davout didn't think so.

means: that on 13 October, at ten o’clock in the evening, in Jena, Napoleon preferred Bernadotte to be in Dornburg during the night, as to have him in position in order to cooperate with the action which should allow the army to come onto the plain. The intervention, on the morning of 14 October, of the 1st Corps coming from Dornburg against the flank and rear of the Prussian defenses in Closewitz and Lutzeroda would have really simplified taking over these places, ensured the Emperor of their possession, and guaranteed the army’s deployment, with a minimum of time and effort.

That was the plan against the main Prussian army as far as Napoleon knew..

But it is clear that if, at the time that Davout’s order to march to Apolda arrived, Bernadotte was still in Naumburg, he could not have arrived in time to join in the first fighting. In such a case, it would be preferable that the 1st Corps join with the 3d Corps, and that both combine their march through Apolda against the rear of the Prussian army, which would already be engaged with the Emperor’s forces concentrated in Jena.

Yes, except Dornburg was only eight miles away. Bernadotte--and Davout--could expect Bernadotte to reach Dornburg in the morning. It was a judgment call, which is why Davout asked him what he was going to do? Bernadotte was still in Naumburg... His Corps was not. It had already begun it's march to Dornburg before 3am. We can argue that he made the wrong call, but to insist that marching with Davout
1. Was ordered, or
2. He should made the decision based on some military imperative beyond the orders
3. That somehow Bernadotte 'should have known' the option of marching with Davout was expected
4. That the order to be in the Dornburg was now not where Napoleon wanted him
5. And if the choice was so, so obvious, why didn't Davout request, insist or assume it in talking to Bernadotte? For such a military stickler and successful marchal, that seems odd of Davout to simply ask Bernadotte what he was going to do.

Those are mighty big leaps from what I can see here.

Did Bernadotte not understand, or did he not want to understand this reasoning? It is not for us to judge. It would seem however that his desire to leave his colleague had supplanted everything else for him. So, during the entire day of 14 October, like what happened with [Drouet] d’Erlon at Ligny, Bernadotte remained useless between two battles; but, contrary to Drouet d’Eron, Bernadotte’s inactivity was due to suspicious motives
The following is some of what happened in the area before the actions of the 14th by both Davout and Bernadotte:
As for contact with the Prussians on the afternoon of the 13th, Davout wrote in his Journal of Operations: ‘By this Prussian movement it was easy to conclude that a large body of troops was moving towards Freiburg or Kosen. In any case, it was important to secure Kosen’s gorge.’-Bressonet, 247
.
‘By five-thirty [13 October], Davout observed Prussian forward posts settle in front of him. Knowing from reports and scouts that the enemy had concentrated his forces near Eckartsberga, he logically came to the conclusion, seeing the line of Prussian vedettes, that these forces were stationed there. Therefore, almost certainly, the enemy would not try an attack against Kosen that evening. It was sufficient to post a detachment large enough to keep the bridge from a possible enemy party.’-Bressonet, 247.

‘Bernadotte, entrusted with supporting Murat, had reached Meineweh on 12 October. On 13 October, knowing that the enemy was still in Erfurt as confirmed by Murat and by all the reports received, Bernadotte began conforming to orders given for such a case, that being to march to Naumburg, where the 1st Corps settled next to marechal Davout’s corps.

When Murat received the Emperor’s order, dated at none o’clock in the morning from Gera, to ‘go as soon as possible with Bernadotte’s corps to Dornburg,’
the two commanders in question got together, and at six o’clock in the evening Bernadotte told the Major General of the decisions taken:
‘We have decided,’ he wrote, ‘to leave immediately for Kamburg and Dornburg.

Despite the troops’ exhaustion, and even though they have not had their soup yet, I will be marching within the next 30 minutes and I will be in Kamburg before midnight; I will have the troops rest a while, and tomorrow morning before dawn, I will be in Dornburt…’

The 1st Corps indeed resumed its march, with marechal Bernadotte had not yet left Naumburg when Davout received the message from the Major General, dated from three o’clock, giving the night’s orders. As soon as he received this message, Bernadotte stopped the movement of his army corps.’-Bressonet, 248-249. .

’

So, Bernadotte had begun the march Dornburg into the night, even though his troops were exhausted. He was still in Naumburg with Davout, not his corps. The order is received. He has a choice and Davout asks for his decision. Continue the march or go with Davout, which would mean some serious backtracking and in any case following behind Davout up the road to Apola.

As with any situation, the more detail you have, the more circumstances are revealed, the less obvious are the 'right decisions'. Bernadotte's quantry was fairly typical of generals in the field. I certainly agree that after the fact, he did make the wrong decision. No question there. That it was obviously wrong or that he *should* have followed Davout, placing him many miles behind Davout on the road, is not at all.

Bill