From Plunket Barton

OCTOBER 14, 1806
' If Marshal Bernadotte should be with you, you might march
together (to Appolda). But the Emperor hopes that he will be in
the position which he indicated to him at Dornburg."
—
Extract from
Berthier's equivocal Despatch which reached Davout at 3 a.m. on 14th
October.
On the night of the 13th October Marshal Bernadotte
bivouacked on the road which led along the eastern
bank of the River Saale to the bridges of Camburg and
Dornburg. Marshal Davout bivouacked on the road
which led straight across the river by the bridge of
Kosen to the plain of Auerstadt, and thence to Appolda.
The battle was fixed for the 15th, and Bernadotte was
at his ease, because he had reason to suppose that he
would have the whole of the 14th in which to occupy
the bridges of Camburg and Dornburg, and to get his
corps into line on the western side of the river.
It was not until 10 p.m. on the night of the 13th

and

It was not until 10 p.m. on the night of the 13th
that Napoleon suddenly made up his mind to fight next
morning ; and Berthier sent orders to that effect to all
the Marshals except to Bernadotte. No order was sent
to him ; but a despatch, which reached Marshal Davout
at about 3 a.m. on the morning of the 14th, contained
the following message " to be communicated to Marshal
Bernadotte if he should be at Naumburg " :
—
Berthier to Davout
" At the Bivouac on the heights of Jena.
" i^th October, lo p.m.
"... Marshal Bernadotte has received orders to go
to Dornburg. It is very important that he should have
138

also

But if he should be at Naumburg that
would make it the more necessary for you to execute
forthwith the following orders, namely, to go to Appolda
and to fall on the enemy's rear, if they should be
engaged with us, as we expect they will. . . . You can
take whatever route you find most convenient, but the
important thing is that you should take part in the
battle. If Marshal Bernadotte should be with you, you
might march together. But the Emperor hopes that he
will be in the position which he has indicated to him at
Dornburg. {Si le MarMial Bernadotte se trouvait avec
vous, vous pourriez marcher ensemble. Mais I'Empereur
esphe qu'il sera dans la position qu'il lui a indiqu6 a
Dornburg.) " ^
This message was in the highest degree equivocal.

So Davout should also march in the direction of Apolda - to be able to take part in the battle at Jena

He was
near, but not " with," Davout. The two corps were
bivouacked on different roads—Bernadotte's corps being
posted on the road to Dornburg, and Davout's on the
road to Kosen. It was obvious that if he were to
march with Davout, and if the Prussians were to escape
or debouch by the bridges of Camburg and Dornburg,
he would incur tremendous blame. The message was
so framed that, whatever might be the event, the Staff
would be able to justify themselves under its terms.
Equivocal orders of this kind were by no means

For me it is evident, that Bernadotte would have lost a lot of time following Davout at Kösen because his corps was already posed for direction Dornburg. Also Napoléon stressed that the already expected Bernadotte to be there (which he wasn't because he stopped his march due to the fact that there was no clash with Lannes and the Prussians at the 13th.
Now the only blame - as Bonnal did - could be - why hadn't Bernadotte continued this march - as original ordered. Answer - because this order implied that Lannes was attacked. So - in my view Bernadotte correctly stopped his corps because the strategical situation has changed and demanded new orders or at least an explaination of the field situation.
I therefore cannot even share Bonnal's critique.