I

disagree-the situation had changed when Davout's outposts were driven in by Prussian cavalry on the afternoon of the 13th. Davout correctly interpreted this as a Prussian movement to the northwest through Naumburg and took action accordingly. He also gave Bernadotte a written copy of the order he received from Berthier at 0300 to Bernadotte at 0400.

Kevin:
If I understand you correctly, you are saying that Davout interpreted his outposts being driven in, necessarily east and south as a Prussian move North and West? That doesn't make a whole lot of sense, particularly when Davout had already made 'contact' with the Prussians previously. As Murat, Bernadotte and Davout were instructed on the 12th to head for Naumburg with the implication that the Prussians would be in that vacinity, and that Davout was instructed to move in that direction anyway on the morning of the 13th, I am not sure how this constitutes either a change of situation or a change in behavior/action on the part of Davout. If the idea was to cut off the retiring Prussians, then Bernadotte's move to Dornburg is quite logical.

Bernadotte chose not to support Davout and began a slow, leisurely march to Dornburg, an objective that was now not important as there was enemy activity and contact on Davout's front. A fight was coming, the only question was the size of the Prussian force. Bernadotte ducked the fight, and left Davout on his own. Whatever Bernadott'e 'motivation' for that decisions and a deliberate disobedience of a written order, he effectively kept I Corps out of the action on 14 October.
For a soldier, it is inexcusable. Bernadotte willfully abandoned a comrade in the face of the enemy and did nothing to contribute to the next day's actions.

Bernadotte's movements were slow, but 'leisurely'? And where do you get the idea that the march to Dornburg was 'now unimportant'? Napoleon didn't think so before the 14th or after, as evidenced by your quote of his expectations. Bernadotte should have been in Dornburg and that is where Napoleon wanted him and faulted him for not being there. The idea that Davout somehow knew "a major battle' was coming on the 14th when he marched out is not supported by the evidence. If Davout didn't know it was coming, then how could Bernadotte duck it?

If he had followed behind Davout instead of following the instructions both received at 3am, THAT would have been a deliberate disobedience of a written order, the one directing him to go to Dornburg. He did fail to get the I Corps in action on the 14th and there probably is no excuse for it, but that doesn't constitute a willful abandonment of a comrade anymore than Murat abandoned Davout. All three followed the orders they received. I think the best view to take is the one taken by experienced soldiers on the ground, particularly, Napoleon, Davout, and those in Bernadotte's command. Who accused him of 1. Deliberately leaving Davout in the lurch on the morning of the 14th? 2. Who insisted that he should have ignored the orders to go to the Dornburg? 3. Who says the situation had changed on the afternoon of the 13th? And 4. Who says that Davout did anything different than what was instructed in his orders leading up to Auerstadt? [In other words, did Davout ignore his orders because the situation had changed?]

Bill