Kevin:

If Bernadotte’s actions were deliberate disobedience, certain conditions have to be evident:

1. The orders have to be clear and overt enough to identify disobedient behavior.

2. The situation at the time has to be equally unambiguous.

3. Those colleagues and subordinates—at the time—have to see the orders as overt and any contrary behavior as deliberate disobedience.

4. If Bernadotte had deliberately ‘abandoned’ Davout, that implies that Bernadotte knew what he was abandoning Davout to… rather than simply poor judgment.

5. When the intentional disobedience is discovered or recognized, it is dealt with as such, rather than simply a poor performance. With a behavior as serious and outrageous as one officer turning their back on a fellow officer in a combat situation—abandoning them to face the enemy alone, how could anyone trust Bernadotte in a combat situation after that? Only out-and-out treason is more heinous behavior to a soldier. We should see Napoleon taking action against Bernadotte equal to the crime. Even with a reprieve from court martial, Napoleon certainly couldn’t put such an officer back in command again, that is, unless Napoleon was also derelict in his own duties.

None of those conditions existed or are in evidence.

1. Bernadotte did not receive any orders, Davout did, and the suggestion ‘he can’ rather than ‘he should’ have Bernadotte march with him was to Davout. To suggest that this was a direct order to Bernadotte, that it meant that he should support Davout simply isn’t there. Bernadotte and Murat both received orders stating that Bernadotte was to support Murat, not that he ‘can march’ with Murat. That Bernadotte should have taken the orders to Davout as orders to him doesn’t fit either who received the orders, how they were worded or even whether they superseded what Napoleon himself identified as his direct orders. His direct orders were to support Murat, who was in Dornburg. Suhac’s cavalry division was assigned to Murat in that same direct order. Bernadotte made some bad decisions, even inexcusable, but in keeping with his last direct orders. But there is no evidence of deliberate disobedience in this at all.

2. Bernadotte’s location at 4 am is not clear, but the location of his corps is, and it wasn’t in Naumburg. It had been marching on the road for several hours that night towards Dornburg. Bernadotte stopped the march when he received the copy of Davout’s orders [which Davout sent] and met with Davout. Even here, “If still in Naumburg” is not clear considering where the I Corps actually was. Davout’s corps was also on the road to Kösen, so technically speaking neither Davout’s or Bernadotte’s forces were in or within miles of Naumburg. The idea that the ‘situation’ had changed because some Prussian cavalry chased some of Davout’s cavalry away around the bridge at Kösen isn’t borne out by either the consequences or Davout’s behavior afterwards. He sent more cavalry and an infantry battalion to secure the Kösen bridge, and had no more contacts that night. The next morning, he did not change his corps’ march, but did go out ahead to find the enemy with a small advanced party. If he had been anticipating enemy resistance or felt the situation had changed, this was rather odd behavior, and dangerous to himself personally. No, he was seeking information to discover the actual situation. As it was, the advance party marched all the way to Hassenhausen before seeing any enemy forces, pickets or scouting parties.

3. Davout does not treat the orders he received as obligatory concerning Bernadotte. Davout clearly records that he asked Bernadotte what he was going to do. Is this the behavior of an officer who sees a colleague receive a clear, direct order—ask him what he is going to do?

4. In the early hours of Oct. 14th, neither Davout or Bernadotte had any idea that a large force of Prussians were moving east towards them. All indications and Napoleon’s instructions clearly placed the main Prussian army around Jena. Davout’s action was to be a flanking movement. If anything, the glory that all French marshals sought was to be found there, rather than on the road to Dornburg. There is nothing in the situation on the morning of Oct. 14th to suggest Bernadotte was ‘abandoning’ Davout to anything particular.

5. There is no question that Napoleon and other French officers believed Bernadotte “behaved badly” and his performance on the 13th and 14th was “disgraceful.” However, nowhere is the idea that he deliberately abandoned a comrade in combat raised. I would think that damning idea, if believed to be true, would have at the least led Napoleon to never placing him in command again. As a leader of men, he would know how damaging such an untrustworthy subordinate can be to a military organization. Yet, Bernadotte was not removed from command in 1806 or 1807 and in later campaigns given command again. It’s not like he didn’t short on marshals.

Your insistence that Bernadotte deliberately disobeyed orders simply doesn’t hold up. Bernadotte may have disliked Davout and wanted to see him fail [not an unusual situation among Napoleon’s marshals, such the relationship between Lannes and Soult] and I am sure Davout was very happy to see Bernadotte embarrassed. Bernadotte certainly screwed up badly, being derelict in his duties. However, there is nothing in either the situation or his actions or the actions of Davout to support the idea that he deliberately disobeyed orders.

Bill